Saturday, June 8, 2013


التنمية البشرية وحقوق الإنسان
المجلة القضائية – لبنان – أبريل 2013

بقلم الدكتور ايلي ابوعون
 المدير التنفيذي للصندوق العربي لحقوق الإنسان  


تعرف التنمية البشرية بثلاثة مكونات اساسية: المكون الإقتصادي/الإجتماعي والمكون الثقافي والمكون السياسي، وهي تؤدي إلى توسيع آفاق الفرد في إتخاذ قرارات متنورة وإعتماد خيارات شخصية من خلال مسار ينقل الفرد من حالة الوجود الجسدي إلى مستوى التعبير عن الذات.”

وفي هذا الإطار لا بد من السؤال عن القواسم المشتركة بين المكونات الثلاثة وتفاعلها للدخول إلى التنمية، كما وبارتباطها بمفهوم العصرنة الذي يتلازم مع قدرة الفرد على إنتاج خيارات شخصية في كل الأمور المتعلقة به.

إن هذه القدرة تتصل بوجود دوافع ووسائل”” لإنتاج خيارات   ؛ علماً أن غياب إحد العنصرين (الدوافع اوالوسائل) يؤثر سلباً على الآخر وعلى المحصلة النهائية أي تحقيق التنمية .

وهنا تأتي المقاربة الحقوقية في أهمية تأمين بيئة حاضنة لكلا العنصرين معاً.

ترتكز هذه المقاربة الى أساس نظري يظهر أهمية حقوق الإنسان (المدنية، السياسية، الإقتصادية، الإجتماعية والثقافية) في تأمين إطار عام مجتمعي يخلق تكاملاً بين الحاجة والحق ويؤسس لمعادلة المواطنة التي توازي بين التمتع بالحق وتأدية الواجب في إطار من المساءلة لصاحب ألحق (المواطن) والمؤتمن على الحق (السلطة) .

رغم أن الملزمة الحقوقية مؤطرة في قالب قانوني دولي إلا أن هذا لا يكفي بحد ذاته إذ يجب إيجاد أطر محلية ووطنية تعزز قبول هذه الملزمة، وهنا يأتي دور السلطة والجهات غير الحكومية المحلية والوطنية في عملية إكساب الحقوق مشروعية محلية تكون مدخلاً إلى بلورة عنصر الاستدامة.

و لما كانت فكرة التنمية ترتكز الى مبدأ التحول أو التقدم وأن الحقوق هي متساوية ومتكاملة فن آنٍ معاً ، لا يمكن التفكير بالتنمية إلا ضمن عملية تدريجية تؤدي  في نهاية المطاف إلى أن يكون الفرد متمكناً من إيجاد الدوافع والوسائل لإنجاز هذا التحولوهذا يفرض أن تكون أهداف التنمية منسجمةً مع مبادئ حقوق الإنسان وإلا باءت بالفشل.

من جهةٍ أخرى، لا تكون التنمية مستدامة إلا عندما تصنع سياسات تؤمن ديمومة  العمل الريعي (تأمين الحاجات من خلال الخدمات) لتنقله  إلى مستوى تمكيني تنموي يغير صفة الفرد من مستفيد إلى  شريك وصاحب حق. وهنا تأتي أهمية إعتماد المقاربة الحقوقية  في تأمين حد أدنى من المساواة واشراك جميع أطياف المجتمع ولاسيما الفئات المهمشة في عملية تعنيهم بالدرجة الأساس.

عند مقاربة عملية صناعة السياسات، نجد أنها تمر بمراحل معينة (وضع الأولويات، تحويل الأفكار والمطالب إلى مقترحات، صياغة السياسة، إقرار السياسة، تنفيذ السياسة، المراقبة والتقييم). إن إتمام هذه المراحل ليس ممكناً في غياب مشاركة فاعلة لجميع الأطراف المعنيين بمن فيهم الأفراد والمجتمعات نفسها. وكيف يمكن في هذه الحالة تصور أي دور لهذه الأطراف في غياب المقاربة الحقوقية؟ فخلاف ذلك يبتر عملية صنع السياسات من اساسها ويعيدنا إلى المربع الأول: سياسات استنسابية تصنعها السلطة منفردةً لا تعكس دوافع المجتمع ولا تؤمن القبول مما يجوف مفهوم التنمية ويفقدها عنصر الاستدامة  

خلاص,,لا بد من الإعتراف بأن إعتماد المقاربة الحقوقية في التنمية ليس بالأمر السهل بخاصةً عندما تحاول الجهة المؤتمنة على الحق (السلطة) ترجمة هذا على المستوى العملاني. ففي معظم الحالات، لا يمكن حصر هذه المهمة بالجهات الحكومية وحدها بل يجب أن تتعداها إلى دور فعال  للجهات غير الحكومية ضمن شراكة بإتجاهين تسمح لكل طرف بالقيام بدوره والتفاعل الإيجابي مع المجتمع من جهة و مع الطرف الآخر من جهةٍ أخرى.



  









Un mariage hybride au Liban

Publié par Arc en Ciel (magazine de l'ONGI 'Nouveaux droits de l'Homme" 
AVRIL 2013

Par le Dr. Elie Abouaoun
Directeur Exécutif du Fonds Arabe pour les Droits Humains
Membre du Comité Directeur de NDH

Le Liban vient de franchir un nouveau pas sur le long chemin d’un meilleur respect des droits. En effet, Nidal Darwich et Khouloud Sukkariyeh, encouragés et encadrés par des activistes de la société civile ont décidé d’utiliser une brèche légale pour contracter un mariage « hybride ».

Nidal et Khouloud, tous les deux musulmans mais de rites différents, ont commencé par se marier religieusement (devant un Cheikh). Cependant, au lieu d’enregistrer le certificat du « mariage religieux » auprès de l’administration libanaise, ils ont opté pour une autre démarche néanmoins historique : Se basant sur l’arrêté n° 60/ LR de 1936, qui date de l’époque du mandat français et qui est encore en vigueur (l’article 10 dispose que les Libanais qui n’appartiennent à aucune communauté sont régis en matière de statut personnel par la loi civile), ils ont demandé à  rayer la mention de leur appartenance communautaire de leurs fiches d’état civil. Donc au final, ils se sont mariés « religieusement », puis en tant qu’époux « légitimes » (devant la loi religieuse), ils se sont fait rayer des registres communautaires et par conséquent ont invoqué leur droit de se marier « officiellement » devant un notaire.

Le parcours juridique de ce fameux « contrat » civil n’est pas moins intéressant. Déposés par les deux nouveaux mariés auprès du ministère de l’Intérieur pour être dument enregistré, ce dernier a décidé de consulter le département d’avis juridiques auprès du ministère de la Justice. Tout cela s’est accompagné d’une campagne sans précédent de plusieurs institutions religieuses, certaines jetant même l’anathème sur les mariés civils, leurs enfants ainsi que tout responsable administratif, politique ou juridique qui faciliterait, d’une façon ou d’une autre, la légalisation du mariage civil. A deux reprises, le département a validé la légalité de la procédure suivie par les deux mariés, ce qui a amené le ministre de l’Intérieur à signer l’inscription de ce contrat de type nouveau dans les registres civils.

L’importance de la démarche initiée par les deux époux Sukkariyeh et Darwich présente plusieurs points d’intérêt :

1-      C’est la première fois que les sympathisants du mariage civil (et activistes de la société civile) sortent du cadre « réactionnaire » pour se positionner en tant que « porteurs d’initiatives » visant des résultats bien concrets. Jusqu’à l’année passée, l’on ne voyait que des manifestations, sit-in et autres protestations symboliques sans impact. C’est la première démarche qui se base sur une recherche juridique, identifie les lacunes de la loi et agit en conséquence pour créer un précèdent juridique et le consacrer en tant que fait accompli. Vue de ce cet angle, c’est la méthode utilisée qui est historique. Elle ouvre la voie à tant d’autres démarches similaires dans le sens d’un plus grand respect des droits de l’Homme.


2-      Tout aussi intéressant est la résistance des juges, employés de la fonction publique et autres acteurs face aux menaces virulentes émises clairement par des membres du clergé musulman et chrétien. Le « dossier » est passé du notaire, aux services du ministère de l’Intérieur, au ministère de la Justice sans être affecté par le veto du clergé. Dans un pays comme le Liban, ce n’est pas une mince affaire et là aussi, ce précèdent serait probablement utilisé dans d’autres campagnes similaires.
3-      Sur le fond, la démarche ne s’est associée à aucun discours politique. Elle n’était que juridique et civile ce qui lui a assuré quand même un support populaire assez large. Au cas où les initiateurs de cette campagne auraient utilisé un langage « provocateur » qui prônerait une laïcité à l’Occidentale ou qui aiguiserait les animosités contre l’establishment religieux, l’on aurait vu un repli identitaire d’une large frange de la population. Tout le génie de cette démarche réside dans le fait qu’elle a commencé par un mariage religieux qui a ôté tout prétexte aux « défenseurs acharnés » des religions, qui dans le cas contraire, auraient pu mobiliser l’opinion publique contre les deux époux. C’est donc une démarche civile qui a refusé de se positionner en porte à faux par rapport à la religion. Au contraire, elle a évité de « diaboliser » la religion en acceptant le mariage religieux tant qu’il est confine à la sphère privée seulement. C’est un message très fort que pour parvenir à un meilleur respect des droits de l’Homme, il ne s’agit pas de déclarer la guerre aux religions. Repositionner  la religion de la sphère mixte publique/privée a la sphère exclusivement privée ne peut se faire à travers une confrontation. Elle a plus de chances de se faire d’une façon rationelle et graduelle.

Pour terminer, il faut bien se féliciter de ce développement positif tant sur le fond que sur la forme et espérer que les acteurs de la société civile au Liban et dans la région arabe sauront tirer les leçons de cette merveilleuse aventure de Khouloud et Nidal. A la prochaine!








Rethinking the “revolution”

Published on Sharnoff Global Views - June 2013

By Dr. Elie Abouaoun – Executive Director – Arab Human Rights Fund -June 2013

Almost two years after Mohammed-Tarek Bou Azizi’s slap on the face ignited a “Jasmin revolution”, the Arab public opinion remains divided over the reasons, the methods and outcomes of what has been called the “Arab Spring”. 

This unexpected uprising in a region where everything, including the regimes, seemed to be set in stone has been perceived and interpreted in many ways, sometimes in delusive ways. While the most optimistic forecasts imagine a happy end following a transition phase, skeptics in the region are already cursing another set of “coups d’état set up by some regional powers”. In between, you would find all sorts of scenarios, theories and polarized interpretations.

If there is one sure thing about the “Arab Spring”, it is definitely the fact that the visible concrete outcomes so far are not encouraging. Except the killing, hibernation or imprisonment of some dictators, there is a prevailing impression that the constituents, underlying mentalities, processes and procedures of the toppled regimes are still there, as they were or slightly mutated to fit the new landscape. The proponents of this theory think that the remnants of the past era are not on their way out. In some cases, they might have been strengthened actually. What is meant here are not the faces themselves but rather how “things were done” before 2011 and how “they are done” now. So it is more about the approach and mentalities rather than the persons. At that level, there seems to be very little progress to be reported.

While it is unrealistic to expect quick and radical changes in just a couple of years, the worrying indicator is rather about whether a real transition process has started or not. In some circles, analogies are drawn between the current changes in the Arab region and the transition of the East European countries in the nineties following the dislocation of the Soviet Empire. In most of these countries, the transition was long and painful with some security problems in few cases. In comparison with today’s context in the Arab region, two major differences can be highlighted: the first one has to do with the low level of violence witnessed in the Eastern European countries despite a high political tension and very controversial and complicated issues such as forced demographic changes (by the Soviets), handling the minorities’ cases, challenges related to transitional justice, rebuilding economies, reforming state institutions including the military…etc. The second difference is the palpable progress that people felt as they progressed in the transition, sometimes only within a period of months or few years. The most noticeable one is the radical change in how State affairs were dealt with; an element that the Arab societies did not see happening yet.





Despite the important historical milestone of the Jasmin revolution in Tunisia, this latter was not the first transition happening in an Arab State. Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003 and Iraq went into a transitional phase that was characterized by a civil war. Most importantly, State affairs were handled almost the same way as pre-2003. Although elections took place, the successive “elected” Prime Ministers tried to assert their power in a way that is little different than what Saddam has done in the 1980’s. The Baath security apparatus was completely dismantled in 2003 and a brand new one put in place. However this did not change the behavior of the newly formed security bodies nor did it change how they are perceived by the population. State agents used the same “black bags” to cover the faces of the persons they went to arrest arbitrarily, torture and detain in secret prison and/or inhumane conditions.

In 2005, Lebanon moved from the Pax Syriana era to a new one characterized by a civic awakening following the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. Eight years later, the Lebanese still suffer from the same problems. Not only nothing has improved but most of the bad practices (corruption, discrimination, torture, illegal detention, absence of social policies, political feudalism, social violence, flawed and politicized judiciary, tampering with constitutional deadline and processes…) , then attributed to Syria’s hegemony, proliferated in a worrying manner.  Lebanese feel they are back to square one.

Many examples can also be cited in Libya (assassinations, new forms of despotism, corruption…) as well as Egypt (use of the military to protect the ruler than the system, corruption, discrimination against minorities, low level of tolerance, influence of the military over civilian and State Affairs, attempts to curb down the legislative and judiciary power…).
It seems obvious that what is happening is more about the overthrow of regimes but not existing social orders. Dare we call this a revolution?

A revolution by definition goes beyond the change of the ruling elite to reach out to the social order and social organization; two aspects that are still missing in the current uprisings. It must be coupled by a change in the social behavior and lead to an “evolution” of the social paradigms. This cannot be achieved without the involvement of all social structures not only in public actions (demonstrations, sit-ins, protests, marches…) but most importantly through the generation of a new social order and a reform of the underlying structures. This means that the social constituents have to revisit their norms, change their behavior and reform all the components of the ecosystem. Changing a regime by a “violent”, “corrupt” or “intolerant” society will surely lead to the rebirth of the same attitudes and behaviors within the power structures; a phenomenon that Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen… are currently witnessing.

Genuinely supporting the current uprisings involves reminding the active forces in the society that the focus has to be put on their own constituencies, not on this president or that minister. Failing to trigger a renewal process at grass root level will lead to the same end product that everyone is complaining about: new dictatorships. Thus the layers and targets of the revolution need to be revisited and the focus reconsidered.


An insight on human rights work from the Arab region
Published on Sharnoff Global Views 

January 2013

Dr. Elie Abouaoun
Executive Director – Arab Human Rights Fund (AHRF)



The Arab region has experienced a number of historical developments in the last two years, a dynamic of change unseen since the 1950s.  Analyzing the whereabouts of this dynamic might be pretentious for a grantmaking organization like AHRF; nevertheless, reflecting on how this reshuffling of the cards would affect the situation of human rights in the region is a much needed exercise at this stage. Cautious as we are, adopting a blanket approach during this reflection is undoubtedly counterproductive. Instead, a set of the largely shared elements that exist at the regional level have to be explored.

While it looks obvious that the recent popular awakenings will open windows of opportunities for human rights actors in the region, the accrued weaknesses of these actors over the last six decades will not be easy to overcome. The devolution of government services, performance, and accountability in many Arab countries led to an increased role for nonprofits in filling the gaps left by the underperforming governments, paralyzed or ineffective parliaments (when they existed at all), and the bureaucratic/corrupt public administration. However, this was not translated in an effective contribution to the policy-making process, and this shortcoming badly affected the credibility and sustainability of NGOs and more specifically human rights organizations.

At times, the work of human rights organizations was depicted (whether rightly or not) as serving a certain political agenda, leading to a certain apprehension. The fact that most opposition groups in the Arab countries used human rights or rights groups to act against established regimes contributed to the image of human rights activism serving a struggle for power instead of fight for values. The quasi absence of independent Arab originated funding to support human rights initiatives in the region strengthened the monopoly of foreign donors which left scars on an already negative perception that rights groups are acting in the stream of foreign agendas. The context of political repression and the fact that most of these organizations in general failed to embrace high standards in their work consolidated these apprehensions, and prevented them from building mass support through small givers and volunteers.

At another level, the repressive framework in most countries of the region contributed to the disengagement of many actors, not the least being the private sector and high net worth individuals. “Capital holders” channeled their donations to “safe interventions”, mostly of social, cultural, and environmental nature. Initiatives related to human rights, policy-making, accountability, and similar topics were avoided in general due to the perceived risks of creating conflicts with governments.

The recent developments in the region have triggered the interest of many governmental and private actors from outside the region. Some countries are flooded with money by major donors, while at the same time NGOs are mushrooming. Consequently, donations will now be sought and used by a large number of organizations of various capacities and purposes. The chaotic development of the civil society sector (more specifically organizations working on human rights, democratization and the like) in the countries undergoing a transition is therefore a major challenge to funders such as the Arab Human Rights Fund.  

The transition processes in the region (as in most other places) will be painful and lengthy. Previous experiences show that such transitions are not reversible and no matter how costly they can be, they will lead to a renewed social contract in each of the affected countries. Moreover, this dynamic will spill over to other countries. In this context, partnering with local and regional grantmaking organizations to maximize on their local knowledge is a key strategy for donor agencies.

In light of the above, the role of a regional fund such as the Arab Human Rights Fund (AHRF) is crucial.

Established in 2008, AHRF was formed at the behest of the Arab region’s human rights community to serve as a regional funding agency with an enduring commitment to the region, to the full spectrum of human rights, and to the painstaking work of mobilizing resources from the region to support human rights projects in the region.
AHRF is a not-for-profit philanthropic organization that provides support for the promotion and realization of all human rights in the Arab region. The AHRF defines 'all human rights' as those enumerated in the International Bill of Rights and all international instruments dealing with human rights and humanitarian law. It carries out its responsibilities and programs in accordance with these rights and principles without discrimination by reason of gender, ethnicity, religion, national or social status, political opinion or any other distinction. The AHRF is independent of any governmental, political, religious or other interests and is committed to operating with transparency and accountability.
Since 2008, the Arab Human Rights Fund has made over $2.2 million in grants to 87 actors to support human rights work in 20 countries in the Arab region.

Responding to the new environment, the Fund is committed to increasing its support for human rights initiatives that seek to use, expand or protect the new political spaces being created by the popular uprisings sweeping the Arab region



Le Centre Catholique de l’Inquisition
Par le Dr Elie Abouaoun
Chargé de Cours à l’Université Saint Joseph
Enseignant vacataire à l’Université Notre Dame Louaize

Publié dans l'Orient le Jour (Quotidien francophone Libanais) - février 2013

Pour certains, Il n’est probablement pas étrange que le néo inquisiteur RP Abdo Abou Kassam jette l’anathème sur ceux qui optent pour le mariage civil. Ca fait des années que des activistes,  chrétiens de surcroît, se posent des questions (parfois dans ces colonnes même à l’instar de Michel Hajji Georgiou) sur la pertinence d’avoir un centre chargé de la moralité de la communauté. Sur le Fond, « décider », que les mariés civils n’ont pas droit aux Sacrements de l’Eglise n’est que le comble d’une hérésie qui doit cesser. J’espère de tout cœur que les jeunes catholiques sauront mesurer le danger de ce genre de pratiques et prendre position.
Le CCI (ou Centre Catholique de l’Inquisition) s’est fait champion de la censure depuis bien longtemps. A ce titre, il s’est arrogé le droit de décider ce que les Chrétiens du Liban doivent lire, voir ou écouter. A défaut d’une résistance culturelle structurée au sein même de la communauté - que le CCI considère comme sa chasse gardée -, ces néo-inquisiteurs reviennent maintenant avec une « Fatwa » bien plus grave : celle de décider qui a accès aux Sacrements du Christ. Que ce genre de jugement soit pris à la légère (normalement l’ex-communion relève de l’autorité d’un Evêque) et communiqué de cette façon cavalière ne fait que pousser les croyants à se poser de plus en plus de questions sur la compétence des gens en charge des fonctions ecclésiastiques sensibles. Mais l’histoire va au-delà des compétences : c’est une question de principe. Qui est en droit de juger les croyants et comment ? Qui est en droit de décider pour toute une communauté ce qui est « moral » et ce qui ne l’est pas ?
Tout d’abord, il y a lieu de rappeler, à ceux dont la mémoire est courte, ce que le Christ lui-même a dit : « Ne jugez pas, afin de n'être pas jugés » (Mathieu 7 :1). Il n'y a en tout cas aucune source biblique pour la procédure d'ex-communion. Et le fait de substituer cette absence de source biblique par un dogmatisme rigide ou un juridisme obscurantiste contredit la nécessité que, sur ces questions éthiques, l'Eglise catholique parte toujours d’un ensemble de principes  au lieu de tomber dans le piège de la néo-inquisition. L’Eglise, engagée au service des droits universels de l’Etre Humain, de la liberté de conscience et, par-dessus tout, au fait que la religion chrétienne est basée sur le principe de la liberté du Croyant et la centralité de sa dignité aux yeux du Créateur ne peut pas permettre à un prêtre de s’arroger la fonction de « censeur ». A travers ces pratiques, le CCI éloigne l’Eglise des principes fondateurs de la religion Chrétienne et, surtout, augmente la faille déjà existante entre les Croyants et l’Establishment ecclésiastique.  A ce titre, l’Assemblée des Patriarches et Evêques Catholiques du Liban est appelée à redéfinir le rôle et la fonction du CCI de façon à neutraliser cette tendance liberticide observée depuis plusieurs années.

C’est à se demander si le CCI me permettra d’aller dimanche à la Messe après la publication de cet article. 
Syria’s refugee crisis: the unseen end of the tunnel
Published in the PHAP newsletter (Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection) 

Dr. Elie Abouaoun
Executive Director
Arab Human Rights Fund

February 2013


Syria has been in turmoil since early 2011. However, the escalation witnessed in the last weeks indicates a change in the nature of the military actions, with considerable and overt implications for civilians. Not only is the geographical area affected by the conflict larger now, but also more deadly weapons are in use and more intense fights are commonly reported. As always, the civilian population is paying the price: we have an estimated death toll of 60,000 persons, 1.2 million internally displaced, and around 600,000 refugees, mainly in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon but also in smaller numbers in other countries, such as Iraq and Egypt. 

The international community has intensified its efforts to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of the conflict-affected population inside Syria and in the neighboring countries where refugees have sought safe haven. Given the likely timeframe of the crisis, and the likelihood of refugees returning, is this enough?

Realizing the plight’s timeframe is key

As in other similar crises, the complexity of the situation becomes more apparent when trying to envisage durable solutions rather than responding to the current humanitarian needs. While the outcome of the ongoing conflict remains unclear, the Syrian refugee crisis is likely to persist for some time. The fact that the military operations in Syria are increasing will further complicate the situation, leading to more displacement, more destruction, and a larger scar in the Syrian social fabric.

Syria’s neighboring countries have received hundreds of thousands of refugees, which has further strained their limited resources. Most of these countries already suffer from significant economic, infrastructural, political, social, and governance-related problems. Most importantly, these countries experience challenges in managing the diversity already existing within them, such as religious and ethnic differences in the cases of Iraq and Turkey, religious differences in Lebanon, and the West/East bank divide in Jordan. Therefore the problem posed by the large numbers of Syrian refugees is not only of an economic nature, but has implications for the existing political and demographic balances in each country.

This reality does not justify the hostile statements encountered from time to time in the media. While concerns related to the absorption capacity of each nearby country are legitimate, they are no excuse for non-compliance with the International Protection Regime of Refugees. The governments of Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have a legal obligation to comply. A certain margin of maneuver exists for these governments when discussing durable solutions to this crisis with the international community. But in the meantime, Syrian refugees should be granted unconditional access to safe havens and provided the necessary protection during their displacement.

While host countries have to provide adequate services and protection, the international community holds the much larger responsibility to assist these countries in their efforts to identify durable solutions for the thousands of families that might not be able to go back to their areas of origin as soon as most people initially thought. Thus, the primary aim of international donors at this stage should not be to flood host countries with money for material assistance. Instead, they need to start seriously working on adequate durable solutions to alleviate the burden put on these countries.

Past experiences from Iraq and other operations are not encouraging. In many cases, the international community has failed in its responsibilities to facilitate the design and ensure timely implementation of durable solutions. Simply put, assuming that there will be a massive return of refugees to Syria in the near future is not a good bet. And very little, if anything, is apparently being done by donors, international agencies, and host countries to address this situation.

Why people will think twice before returning

The spontaneous answer of most Syrian refugees would be that the only viable solution for them is to return home; very few of them realize the bitter reality that this will not happen soon.

First and foremost, in order to take a decision to return, refugees need to feel that their security and safety will be ensured. And here, one should not mistake the general security situation with the “perception of individual safety” that each refugee has to feel in order to return. There are a number of factors that will make security one of the major challenges for years to come: the evolution of the military operations, which now involve most of the Syrian regions, the scale of the killings, the chaotic proliferation of weapons, and the extreme polarization in the country, which currently divides according to whether you are pro- or anti-Assad as well as whether you are for or against an Islamic regime for the post Assad era

On the other hand, the infrastructure in Syria was already obsolete before the conflict. With the large scale destruction, protracted conflict, and the guerilla war currently going on, it is clear that Syria’s infrastructure would require, in the best case scenario, several years to be rehabilitated. Even before 2011, the economic situation in Syria was quite bad. Given the scarcity of resources in the country, major economic improvements are not expected until relative stability is reached and structural reforms to an archaic state-run economic system are implemented. Such reforms need several years to start having an impact. The speed of economic development in Syria will have a major impact on the return of refugees.


A protracted crisis

All signs indicate that the Syrian refugee crisis will become protracted. If this becomes the case, returning to their areas of origin will become a less viable option for most of the displaced. This will mean that some of them will stay in their host countries while some returnees and the IDPs will find themselves in a situation of secondary displacement inside Syria. With time, there will be more and more reasons why people will feel reluctant to go back home. Such predictions have implications for the way the return process should be planned and financed.

At the donor level, considering the crisis as a short-term humanitarian emergency would be shortsighted. Syria will require a long-term investment from donors that should not focus primarily on the economic aspects but instead mainly on the political and social aspects.

Any return movement will be conditioned by the future political demographics of the country, including the formation of religious, sectarian, or ethnically homogenous sub-regions, whether they are virtual or physical. The way in which an eventual political process is put in place and the level to which it will be inclusive is also a determining factor, together with considerations related to security, infrastructure, and economic opportunities.

On another level, the return process will also be conditioned by the general political, economic, and security situation in the already vulnerable host countries, as well as their willingness and capacity to keep large numbers of refugees on their territories and the levels of funding provided by the international community.

Concluding note


The outstanding question today is whether the international community and the specialized refugee agencies will be able to draw lessons from previous displacement crises and design a proper strategy for this complex situation in a highly volatile environment. The starting point is to capture the timeframe of this crisis in a realistic manner. Will things be different this time?