Baghdad’s Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo / Sean Kane & Dr. Elie Abouaoun United States Institute of Peace

Baghdad’s Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo

Sean Kane  & Dr. Elie Abouaoun  / United States Institute of Peace / 18 October 2011

(http://www.usip.org/publications/baghdad-s-wary-support-the-syrian-status-quo)

The starting point for understanding how Iraq’s Shiite-led government evaluates the popular unrest in Syria is its wariness towards the uncertainties associated with a change in the secular, Alawite-dominated regime in Damascus. Especially given the historic rivalry between the two countries and their repeated interventions in each other’s politics, the gradual improvement in bilateral relations over recent years is one of Iraq’s few foreign policy bright spots. Indeed, following encouragement from Iran, Assad played a role in brokering a second term in office for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki late last year.

 

Baghdad’s new rulers believe that the United States is underestimating the possible dangers associated with a sudden ouster of Assad, including sectarian conflict in Syria or the emergence of a Sunni Islamist political order in Damascus. They believe that either outcome could have a profoundly destabilizing effect on Iraq’s still fragile politics (or tilt the balance of power away from its current leading players). These concerns are buttressed by threats from some members of the Assad regime’s inner circle that Syria will not "suffer alone" from instability, with Iraq seen as one place where retaliation could occur.

 

On the security front, with U.S. troops departing and Iraqi Security Forces not yet fully capable of policing the country’s borders, Iraqi officials are also concerned about the ramifications of sustained unrest in Syria for their country’s internal stability. This is because Syria was the main springboard for weapons and foreign fighters entering Iraq during the latter’s descent into sectarian conflict after 2003. More recently, the biggest exception to the warming in Syrian-Iraqi relations came in 2009 when Maliki publicly fingered Ba’athist exiles sheltering in Syria as responsible for a series of devastating truck bombings in the Iraqi capital.

Notwithstanding these attacks, since 2007-2008 the Syrian regime has generally acted to restrict the flow of jihadists into Iraq through increasing cooperation with Iraqi intelligence services and, in some cases, even directly with the U.S. military. Now that Damascus has accused the U.S. of fomenting insurrection against it, this cooperation may be reversed. In this scenario, if Syrian forces are distracted by unrest, or if the country descends into full scale civil war, Baghdad worries that its porous desert border with Syria could once again become a major supply route for foreign fighters and arms.

Finally, trade and particularly the import of Syrian goods into Iraq have been disrupted by the unrest. However, economic relations between Iraq and Syria are not as important to Baghdad as trade with Iran and Turkey. Iraqi trade with Syria was estimated to be $900 million in 2009 (as compared to $5 -$6 billion per year with both Iran and Turkey), with most imports consisting of agricultural and light industrial commodities. Iraqi exports to Syria meanwhile consist of energy products, primarily crude oil, and have been less affected by recent border closures by Damascus as they are considered essential to the Syrian economy.

Modest Influence and Modest Support

The Iraqi government has taken a cautious approach towards the unrest in Syria, betraying a clear bias towards stability over popular Syrian demands.This policy has attracted widespread international commentary regarding Iranian influence over Baghdad’s foreign policy.

But the Iraqi government has independent interests in the status quo and few immediate gains from regime change. This is not to discount Iranian influence in Baghdad, but to note that the relationship is complex, and only one of several factors determining Iraqi policy toward Syria. While many Iraqi leaders do desire good ties with Iran, they also wish to avoid becoming beholden to Tehran as the U.S. military departs Iraq. Paradoxically, some in Baghdad believe that the downfall of Assad could increase the likelihood of this by causing Iran to "double down" on its interests in Iraq and the broader Gulf region.

In any case, Baghdad’s direct influence over the situation in Syria is relatively limited. Iraq is still in a state of internal flux and its military is unable to project power externally. Iraq’s only real hard option to affect the situation in Syria would be to reverse the flow of militants over the last decade and send weapons and supplies over the border to support Syrian protestors. Tribal ties and smuggling networks mean this is happening to some extent on a local level, but it is not state policy. Baghdad in fact likely perceives a shared interest with Damascus in limiting this cross-border tribal activity. The Iraqi government is nervous about the prospect of increased linkages between Saudi Arabia, a new Sunni political order in Syria, and Sunni Arab tribes in western Iraq.This is especially the case since groups like the Shammar tribal confederation span all three countries and because some of Iraq’s senior Sunni Arab politicians have hinted at the formation of an autonomous Sunni federal region in western Iraq. The Iraqi government now appears to be coordinating with their Syrian counterparts in managing the border, including closing a UNHCR camp set up to receive Syrian refugees and withdrawing Iraqi citizenship from tribal families purportedly of Syrian descent living along the border.

The other arena in which the Iraqi government brings modest influence to bear is in the economic realm. Iraq is the biggest destination for Syrian exports (19% of their total) and a key source of energy imports for Damascus. In July, Iraq and Syria pledged to work together to strengthen their long-term trade relationship, including repairing an oil pipeline and build a new gas pipeline that would allow Iranian gas exports to reach Syria via Iraq. These steps may provide a boost to Damascus but are not game changers able to alter the trajectory of events in Syria. Nevertheless, by continuing to host Syrian trade and diplomatic delegations, Baghdad has signaled support for the Assad regime when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states have recalled their ambassadors, and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League have criticized the ongoing violence.

In this sense, the economic relationship is probably of greater strategic significance to the embattled Syrian regime than it is to Iraq. This could become even more the case should additional sanctions be placed on Syria. In another potential role reversal, Damascus might look to its porous border with Iraq as way to skirt sanctions (as Saddam Hussein used Syria to subvert UN sanctions prior to 2003).

Internal Debate and Discomfort

Just as there is no single unified Iraqi foreign policy, it would be a mistake to ascribe a single Iraqi point of view towards the complex events in Syria. This is especially the case as long as the organizing principle of Iraqi politics is the competition between Maliki’s State of Law and Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya coalitions and the strong overlay of regional and sectarian interests which they represent.

Leading Shiite figures, such as Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr, have been hesitant to directly criticize the Assad regime and have implied that an overthrow of the Syrian "pillar of resistance" will benefit Israeli and other external interests in the region. In contrast, Osama Najaefi, the senior-most Sunni official in government, has said straightforwardly that the Assad government is suppressing the freedoms of the Syrian people and that it is unacceptable to use violence to put down protests. Iraqi Kurdish leaders meanwhile have welcomed recent developments, believing that Syria has been the supply line for the vast majority of terrorist attacks in northern Iraq and that short term instability is outweighed by the benefits of regime change. They have, however, been cautious in their public statements, and counseled Syrian Kurds to be strategic about not providing Damascus with the opportunity to paint developments as anything other than a nationalist uprising.

 

The reality of the Iraqi response, however, is more complex than simple sectarian politics. Syria is not Bahrain, where the various Iraqi political blocs lined up with stark symbolic positions on the controversial Saudi-led military intervention in the tiny, Shiite majority island’s protests. Developments in Bahrain had little potential to directly affect Iraq’s political stability and security. This is not the case with Syria, with its size, regional heft and geographic proximity to Iraq.

There is also a degree of solidarity among the Iraqi public with Syrian protestors that the Iraqi government must balance. Local newspaper editorials and some Shiite political figures have expressed moral disappointment with the Iraqi government’s weak support for the Syrian people.

 Some in Maliki’s own Da`wa party have privately expressed discomfort with government policy based on the perceived parallels between the current violent suppression of Syrian protests and their own struggle against the Iraqi Ba`ath. These realities have necessitated a more nuanced government position on Syria. Maliki has recently tempered his support for Assad and intermittent labeling of protestors as rioters by urging Syria to accelerate reforms. One of his closest advisors recently went as far as to say that Iraq is against dictatorship and one-party rule in Syria. But when it comes to how the Syrian system can be reformed, the adviser said that the Iraqi government has a different view from the U.S. because there is no way to guarantee that Assad’s departure does not create chaos in Syria, and, ultimately, for its next-door neighbor.

Endotes

 

1. Ally of Assad Says Syria Will Fight Protests Till ‘the End’ (New York Times, Anthony Shadid, May 10)

2. SYRIA: Crisis may hurt economies of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq (Los Angeles Times, Ibrahim Saif, August 13)

3. Iraqi Leader Backs Syria, With a Nudge From Iran (New York Times, Michael Schmidt and Yasir Ghazi, August 12)

4. Iraqi Shi’ites fear fallout of Syria turbulence (Reuters, Rania El-Gamal, Sept 28)

5. Citizens in Al-Anbar state sectarian issues behind withdrawn citizenships (Sharqiya, Sept 12)

6. Iraq should back Syria’s uprising (The Guardian, Hayder al-Khoei, June 10)

7. Iraq Calls for Assad to Resign in Syria (New York Times, Michael Schmidt and Yasir Ghazi, September 20). In a sign of the complexity of this issue, the advisor quickly repudiated the comments attributed to him in the article.

Lutter contre les recidivistes

Published in L'Orient le Jour (French language daily newspaper in Lebanon)
Nous commémorons cette semaine le triste anniversaire de la répression sauvage d’août 2001. Dix ans après, il est désolant de réaliser que les choses n’ont pas vraiment changé en termes de libertés publiques. Le séisme politique de 2005 devait mener à une criminalisation des pratiques répressives de l’ère de la tutelle syrienne. Certes, quelques progrès timides furent enregistrés entre 2005 et 2010, mais qui restent insignifiants si l’on tient compte de l’ampleur du problème et des promesses affichées par la majorité des forces politiques, tant avant 2005 (quand certaines de ces forces étaient en dehors du pouvoir et elles-mêmes réprimées) que durant les « saisons » électorales en 2005 et 2009.
Depuis quelques semaines, il y a eu une intensification des mêmes pratiques, tant directement par les organes de sécurité, qu’indirectement par le bais de quelques ministres zélés. Ainsi, il y a eu successivement, et en l’espace de quelques semaines, des atteintes à la liberté d’expression (déclarations intimidantes du ministre de l’Information et des ministres Fattouche et Kanso, répression de manifestants pacifiques à Hamra, films interdits...), des attaques contre les journalistes (Lassa, banlieue sud...), des convocations d’activistes de droits de l’homme assorties de menaces. Et j’en passe. Pour un gouvernement qui ne cesse de louer ses vertus centristes, réformatrices, conciliantes, respectueuses des engagements internationaux, c’est plus qu’un faux pas : c’est d’une consécration de certaines pratiques qu’il s’agit. Quelques nostalgiques au sein des appareils militaire et judiciaire profitent de la présence à la tête du pouvoir d’un conglomérat de militaires, de paramilitaires et d’hommes d’affaires, peu intéressés par les droits de l’homme, pour récupérer la marge de manœuvre perdue après 2005. Il est impératif de les empêcher de le faire.


Dans ce contexte, rien n’est plus surprenant que le silence complice (par action ou par omission) de certaines forces politiques. Le Courant patriotique libre est le premier concerné par cette régression de la pratique démocratique. Et cela pour deux raisons : d’abord parce que ses piliers ont mené une bataille acharnée entre 1990 et 2005 pour empêcher ce mode de gouvernement de prévaloir ; ensuite parce qu’ils constituent aujourd’hui une composante essentielle du gouvernement et du Parlement. Il est consternant de les voir maintenant considérer que cette bataille est « superflue », que la torture est admise pour les « espions » (dixit Ziad Assouad, représentant de la nation, dont le crâne fut brisé en août 2001 par les services de renseignements) ou que les droits de l’homme ne sont qu’un « label commercial ». Les militants du CPL se sont-ils sacrifiés quinze ans durant pour un simple « label commercial » ou pour se retrouver en train d’être sermonnés sur le concept absurde de la « liberté responsable » alors que le CPL détient dix portefeuilles ministériels et compte un bloc de vingt-sept députés ?


Cette responsabilité du CPL est sans aucun doute partagée par les forces du 14 Mars pour toute la période 2005-2010. Même si leur contrôle du gouvernement n’était pas absolu durant les cinq ans, certains d’entre eux étaient à la tête de ministères-clés (Intérieur, Justice, Information, Défense...). Peut-être qu’ils sont plus subtils en matière de communication, mais leur performance « réelle » est aussi médiocre que celle des autres.


Il y a urgence. La société civile a déjà pris des initiatives. Il faut qu’un bloc de députés, de ministres, d’anciens ministres, de figures académiques, religieuses, etc. se mobilisent non pas pour critiquer ou défendre un gouvernement ou un parti, mais pour accompagner la société civile dans ses démarches visant à contrer la tendance répressive. Pour une fois, il ne faut pas que les récidivistes l’emportent. Parce que dans ce cas, il n’y aura de place pour aucun des projets politiques qui se disputent l’espace public : il n’y aura que des autoritaires, une race qui est en train de disparaître de la région, mais qui « renaît » au Liban.


Élie ABOUAOUN
Chargé de cours à l’Université Saint-Joseph

Iraq's al-Sadr Movement (written in 2011)

Iraq's al-Sadr Movement (June 2011) 

By: 

Elie Abouaoun

USIP’s Elie Abouaoun, based in the Institute’s Baghdad office, discusses the al-Sadr movement – and why it once again stands to be a destabilizing force in Iraq and region.

June 2, 2011

USIP’s Elie Abouaoun, based in the Institute’s Baghdad office, discusses the al-Sadr movement – and why it once again stands to be a destabilizing force in Iraq and region.

• What is the ideology of the al-Sadr movement (SM) and how it does operate?
• What is behind the recent surge in the activities of the Sadr movement and how will this impact the situation in Iraq?
• How does USIP’s work in Iraq help address the potential for conflict and violence?

What is the ideology of the al-Sadr movement (SM) and how it does operate?

Al-Sadr movement is an Iraqi political party headed by Muqtada Al-Sadr, son of the slain widely influential Mohammed Baqer al-Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr, has been claiming to represent his father’s political and religious legacy. He aggressively promoted an anti-Western agenda as well as an application of a strict Islamic regime in Iraq.

In 2003, al-Sadr established a militia called “al-Mahdi army” (Jaysh Al-Mahdi-JAM) to “liberate Iraq”. He started by calling for a political resistance against the “occupation” that quickly turned into intense military confrontations with the Multi National Forces and other rival Shia parties. In 2003, al-Sadr established religious courts throughout the country and attempted to assume the role of government. In the South and parts of Baghdad, an alarming raise has been registered in attacking/banning anything considered “anti-Islamic,” such as CD/DVD shops, Internet cafes, musical bands, “suspicious” restaurants and hotels, alcohol trades, unveiled women. The trend in radicalizing Iraq’s everyday’s life was not exclusive to the Southern governorates; however the SM was the spearhead in promoting this type of Islamic regime in its areas of control.

The Mahdi Army survived a first setback in the Najaf battle against U.S. forces in June 2004 leading to the creation of several spin-off movements such as the “League of the Righteous,” Al-Fadhila party (The Virtue Party) and other smaller groups that currently share the public base of the Sadrists (as it was shown by the successive elections held since 2005).

Between 2004 and 2008, the Mahdi Army attempted to reassert their control in the predominantly Shia areas, promoting the same political agenda and using a strong anti-Western discourse. This period ended in 2008 when the government managed to uproot the Mahdi Army from Baghdad and the South, as a result of a large military intervention. Al-Sadr movemement nevertheless continued to play an active role in Iraq’s tumultuous politics but without its powerful military wing.

This period is also characterized by the absence of Muqtada al-Sadr himself who decided to complete his religious studies in Iran seeking advanced religious credentials that would allow him to claim back the main religious institutions (Al-Hawza) previously controlled by his father.

Large amounts of money are spent through the movement’s religious and social structures in part to “educate” youngsters on the virtues of the “Islamic regime,”, the “vice” of the West, the conspiracy against Muslims.

Back to top

What is behind the recent surge in the activities of the Sadr movement and how will this impact the situation in Iraq?

Since his return to Iraq in January 2011, Muqtada Al-Sadr’s political discourse has been firm but less aggressive. He focused much more on domestic issues and the performance of the government, granting Prime Minister Maliki a six months grace period to improve the basic services.

The recent discussions about the possibility of Iraq requesting an extension for the U.S. forces, however, triggered a strong reaction from Muqtada al-Sadr – saying that any decision extending the U.S. military presence would be faced by a “political” resistance, against the “occupation” and the entities “associated to it,” such as civilian contractors, journalists, and staffers for international organizations.

Even though Muqtada Al-Sadr is now insisting on “political” resistance only, it is not excluded that the military wing of the movement will directly engage in non-political forms of resistance (as in 2003) mainly because he does not have a full control over all brigades of the Mahdi Army and because he is quite vulnerable to the pressure from Iran.

While the Central and North-Central governorates are witnessing the re-activation of some radical Sunni groups, the developments in the South indicate intense efforts to restructure the Mahdi Army, bring back its notorious military commanders from Iran, and actively disseminate anti-Western feelings at grassroots levels. While it will be more difficult for the movement to win back Karbala and Najaf due to the presence of rival and powerful clerics, the coming weeks will show how much it will be able to acquire a solid popular support in other areas of Southern Iraq.

Technically, all options in Iraq are open. One can envision a general state of destabilization as a worst case scenario or tit for tat operations in Iraq as part of the “exchange of messages” between Iran and the West or other regional powers.

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How does USIP’s work in Iraq help address the potential for conflict and violence?

USIP is currently focused on promoting reconciliation and moderation, strengthening government institutions and civil society, and helping Iraqi youth acquire a stake in peace and stability through empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in direct interventions in the field.

Many of USIP’s project help address situations of rising tensions such as the one we are now seeing in Iraq. USIP supports many networks working for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and the promotion of rule of law.

Through the Network of Iraqi Facilitators (NIF), USIP enhances inter-communal engagement and reconciliation in Iraq. USIP provides as well micro grants to NIF members to design and deliver community-level conflict projects. This allows a direct outreach to the areas where potential conflicts might arise.

USIP continues its work with the Alliance of Iraqi Minorities, an advocacy network of individuals and nongovernmental organizations formed from USIP-sponsored dialogues in 2010.

On another level, USIP is engaging both Muslim women and religious figures encouraging focus on the connection between religion and peace. Because media also retains the possibility of being used for incitement to hatred and violence, USIP is working with a group of Iraqi news directors, media regulators and civil society media monitors to improve the quality of news coverage. USIP is also developing working relationships among local, provincial and national leaders from Kirkuk and helping them to reach consensus on a priority set of issues important to the development of the province through a collaborative problem solving mechanism. USIP’s mission in Iraq is to strengthen local capacities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts peacefully and promote the achievement of conditions which advance stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. The wide range of interventions described above allows USIP to contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding at both the national and local levels in Iraq.

Photo Fatale

Published in L'Orient le Jour (French language daily newspaper in Lebanon)

Ca aurait pu avoir lieu n’importe quand entre 1990 et 2005: les organisateurs d’une exhibition photographique à Beyrouth décident de fermer boutique dix jours avant la fin prévue à cause de la censure. Mais l’incident a lieu en mai 2011.
Dans les faits, les organisateurs du « World Press Photo Exhibit » (organisé à Beyrouth) prennent la décision de fermeture suite aux injonctions « officielles » d’enlever les photos d’Amit Shaal, prétextant le fait qu’il est de nationalité israélienne. A noter que le photographe a reçu le troisième prix du concours international de la « World Press Photo of the Year » en 2011 et c’est à ce titre que ses photos étaient exposées.

Donc, rien que de par la nationalité du photographe, les photos de cet artiste deviennent fatales et constituent un danger pour la sécurité nationale. Rien mois que ca, quand même.
Apparemment, le gouvernement n’a pas encore compris l’inutilité de son rôle de censeur dans le nouveau « village global » que constitue notre petit monde. En jouant son rôle d’inquisiteur, le personnel de la Sureté Générale et des autres organes ne cessent de montrer un excès de zèle effleurant l’idiotie. Alors que des touristes sont kidnappés en plein jour, des citoyens sont menacés presque partout par l’activité grandissante des brigands et autres consorts, nos agents publics ne prennent acte que du danger des photos d’Amit Shaal, montrant des rues à des époques différentes.
Au delà de cette mentalité moyenâgeuse, il serait judicieux de se poser des questions sur l’autorité politique qui gouverne ce pays ; toutes tendance confondues. L’incident de cette exhibition n’est pas le premier cas de censure et n’est pas le plus scandaleux en tout cas. Cette tendance répressive montre que rien ne différencie les courants politiques quand il s’agit de médiocrité : ni le ministre de la culture (du 14 mars), ni le ministre de l’intérieur (du centre), ni les « tuteurs politiques » de la Sureté Générale (du 8 mars), ni le pouvoir judiciaire, ni la Chambre des députés n’ont pu mettre un terme à la pratique de la censure, du moins depuis mai 2008 (pour enlever le faux prétexte de « combats existentiels » que certains utilisent pour justifier leur médiocrité). Pour ceux d’entres eux qui affirmeraient qu’ils n’ont pu rien faire, la réponse est simple : ce n’est pas une tare de ne pas pouvoir tout faire (surtout au Liban) mais il faut au moins informer l’opinion publique de ce que vous avez essayé de faire et pourquoi ca n’a pas réussi. Le devoir de réserve a des limites qu’il faut respecter pour ne pas se transformer en une rétention d’information.

Campagnes anticonfessionnelles : une bataille perdue d’avance

Published in L'Orient le Jour (French language daily newspaper in Lebanon)


Nul ne conteste le fait que le système politique libanais souffre de problèmes structurels. Mais



la question qui se pose (ou plutôt s'impose) est de savoir si la stratégie employée par les


organisateurs des dernières campagnes « anticonfessionnelles » est efficace et pertinente. Le


fait d'exposer dans ces colonnes ce que je considère être des éléments d'échec (de ces


campagnes) n'a pas pour but de dénigrer les personnes ou les organismes qui les mènent,


mais plutôt de contribuer constructivement au débat en suggérant une vision bien différente.


La règle générale dit que toute « révolution » commence par un groupe restreint de


personnes. Pour pouvoir produire un changement réel, ces révolutionnaires devraient être


rejoints, dans un second temps, par « une masse » ; ce qui ébranlerait le système en place


(à cause du débordement) et mènerait à un changement de la situation antérieure. Donc, à


défaut de l'engagement d'une masse, toute tentative de changement reste sans suite. Ce qui


fait que dans le cas des campagnes anticonfessionnelles au Liban, il faut commencer au plus


tôt par communiquer avec la masse pour la rallier au mouvement. Pour réussir cet exercice, il


faudrait développer un « discours » qui soit « attractif » et « accepté » par une majorité de


citoyens. Cela n'a pas lieu, du moins jusqu'à ce jour.


La première confusion se situe au niveau du concept lui-même. Quelle est la définition du


« confessionnalisme » ? On veut que les gens prennent la rue pour manifester contre un


concept qui est vague et mal compris ou, au mieux, perçu d'une manière différente par une


société aussi hétérogène que dispersée. Pour bien cibler le public, il faut commencer par une


définition claire et précise du phénomène, qui refléterait une perception commune sans


attiser les peurs. L'on peut donc remplacer le mot absurde de « confessionnalisme » par un


terme plus clair comme « le système discriminatoire » pour bien montrer que le but est


d'arriver simplement à un système qui ne génère pas de discriminations (à caractère


confessionnel ou autre, puisque la discrimination n'est pas que confessionnelle). Il faut donc


mobiliser contre les discriminations générées par le système en place et non pas promouvoir


un « nouveau » régime aux contours mal définis nommé par les organisateurs « non


confessionnel » ; pour la simple raison que toute ambiguïté au niveau du public mènera à des


interprétations erronées qui, à leur tour, nourriront des peurs primitives et empêcheront des


segments de la masse de rallier la cause. Les exemples de régimes politiques dans le monde


qui assurent un respect acceptable des droits de l'homme sont nombreux (État nation comme


la France, système fédéral comme l'Allemagne ou l'Espagne, démocratie consociative comme


la Suisse, etc.). Ce n'est donc pas la nature du système qui empêche les discriminations mais


plutôt les valeurs fondatrices ainsi que les normes de fonctionnement qui empêchent les


dérives. Quel est le but alors de promouvoir un modèle spécifique sinon de s'aliéner un grand


nombre de Libanais ?


La seconde faille dans ces campagnes est dans l'absence d'objectifs spécifiques et bien


réfléchis. L'objectif principal de ces campagnes est « de faire chuter le régime


confessionnel ». De quel régime parle-t-on ? Techniquement, au Liban, il n'y a pas un


dictateur qui s'impose au sommet. Il y a quand même des élections et ce sont les mêmes


masses (qui doivent être ciblées par les organisateurs pour réussir la révolution) qui élisent


un establishment politique. Si les résultats de ces élections contribuent à pérenniser un


système discriminatoire, c'est que les valeurs de cette « masse » du peuple sont semblables


au régime qu'elle soutient. C'est vrai qu'il y a un segment de la société qui conteste ces


valeurs, mais le facteur crucial est de convaincre « la masse » et non pas de l'ostraciser. Ce


dont se plaignent les organisateurs n'est pas exclusif à la vie politique. Il existe à tous les


niveaux de la société. Encore une fois, ce sont des dérives générées par une certaine échelle


de valeurs qui nécessite une réforme. Ce n'est nullement à coups de manifestations et de


mises en scène médiatiques (comme ce décor pathétique d'un micro monté sur un tonneau


lors d'une conférence de presse) que l'on réussira à convaincre la masse. La pierre angulaire


est donc l'élaboration d'une série d'interventions communautaires auxquelles doivent prendre


part une diversité d'acteurs et non seulement la société civile. Qui a dit que le patronat (pris


juste comme exemple) n'a pas son mot à dire et/ou un rôle à jouer ? Comment s'est-on


adressé au patronat, aux autres composantes et aux autres faiseurs d'opinions de la société ?


Depuis bientôt un quart de siècle, ce sont les mêmes figures et/ou les mêmes associations


qui montent au créneau avec une même approche archaïque et obsolète. N'est il pas temps


de revoir cette stratégie, identifier les leçons des échecs antérieurs et innover ? Depuis la fin


des années 1980, il fallait commencer par admettre que le problème n'est pas la classe


politique mais plutôt les valeurs de la société elle-même. Si tout cet effort fut déployé pour


cibler les « esprits » plutôt que les « textes » (pour reprendre ce malin jeu de mots en


arabe), l'on aurait probablement avancé au moins d'un degré.


En même temps, il aurait été pertinent par exemple d'étudier les possibilités juridiques et


constitutionnelles. Dans le préambule de la Constitution, la clause « C » stipule que « le Liban


est une république démocratique, parlementaire, fondée sur le respect des libertés publiques


et en premier lieu la liberté d'opinion et de conscience, sur la justice sociale et l'égalité dans


les droits et obligations entre tous les citoyens sans distinction ni préférence », alors que la


clause « H » affirme que « la suppression du confessionnalisme politique constitue un but


national essentiel pour la réalisation duquel il est nécessaire d'œuvrer suivant un plan par


étapes ». L'article 7 de cette même Constitution confirme le principe d'égalité : « Tous les


Libanais sont égaux devant la loi. Ils jouissent également des droits civils et politiques, et


sont également assujettis aux charges et devoirs publics, sans distinction aucune. » Même


l'honni (voire détesté), l'article 9 peut être en faveur d'un système égalitaire. Cet article


affirme : « La liberté de conscience est absolue. En rendant hommage au Très-Haut, l'État


respecte toutes les confessions et en garantit et protège le libre exercice à condition qu'il ne


soit pas porté atteinte à l'ordre public. Il garantit également aux populations, à quelque rite


qu'elles appartiennent, le respect de leur statut personnel et de leurs intérêts religieux. » Cet


article confirme le respect absolu de la liberté de conscience, dont celle (éventuellement) de


ne pas être un croyant ou de ne pas s'affilier à un rite.


Toujours au niveau des objectifs, je ne vois toujours pas la pertinence des requêtes soumises


par les organisateurs aux autorités. Il y a là de tout, de l'abolition du « régime


confessionnel » à l'environnement, à la gestion de l'eau, aux problèmes des réfugiés, aux


abus contre les travailleurs étrangers, etc. Un réquisitoire digne d'une déclaration


gouvernementale plutôt que d'une action spécifique et ciblée de la société civile. Les


organisateurs essaient-ils de nous convaincre que le système électoral « confessionnel » est


responsable des abus dont sont victimes les travailleurs étrangers ? Ou bien est-ce la


répartition confessionnelle des trois présidences qui fait que l'eau est dilapidée et mal gérée


au Liban ? Le monde arabe n'a régressé qu'à cause de cette stérilité intellectuelle qui a fait


que tous les problèmes des sociétés arabes furent liés uniquement au conflit avec Israël.


Nous nous sommes retrouvés, cinquante ans plus tard, avec des sociétés sous-développées à


plus d'un niveau. Le fait de lier tous les problèmes au Liban au seul facteur du


« confessionnalisme » relève de la même approche et mènera aux mêmes résultats. Il faut


avoir le courage si l'on veut déterminer objectivement les tenants et les aboutissants réels de


tous les problèmes et les traiter rationnellement. Maintenir cette unicité dans la pensée ainsi


qu'une certaine perspective « révolutionnaire classique » ne rendra nullement service aux


multiples volontés de changement qui existent actuellement au Liban.


Il faut sûrement beaucoup moins d'émotions et un brin de raison pour réussir une entreprise


extrêmement compliquée; celle de concilier une bonne gestion de la diversité libanaise avec


les impératifs de l'égalité et la non-discrimination.

Food for thought on the unrest in MENA countries

Not published

 

Ö      Introductory note

This paper is not meant to be a thorough analysis or to bring answers to complex questions. It was written more as a food for thought about major and almost unprecedented political developments in the region.

Ö      The context

The MENA region has experienced an unprecedented wave of unrest since January 2011. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the region witnessed a tremendous amount of coups, revolutions…etc. to replace regimes and monarchies supported by the “colonial” and “imperial” powers. This trend almost stabilized since the 1970s -with the exception of Iran in 1979. The regimes created during this period, and the personalities behind them, managed to achieve relative stability in their countries, at the expense of human rights, democratic transition of power, economic and social development….etc.  In brief, what emerged throughout the region were regimes run by kleptocrat-dictators. Several questions come-up as a result of the recent developments: what are the dynamics behind the 2011 uprisings, what will be the impact on the societies of these countries, who will take advantage of the induced change, and what the broader implications on the region are.

Ö        Expectations & perceptions

The movements arose from country specific conditions and do not seem to be a vast conspiracy with a single perpetrator or agenda. In Tunisia and Egypt where the social structure is more or less homogenous, the main trigger was the harsh socio economic conditions in a context of a dictatorship and the target was the “ruling family”. In countries where vertical divisions exist (Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan…), the dynamics are completely different; it is more a struggle for power between political/religious/tribal groups. Lybia might be a hybrid situation where both elements co-exist.

The real issue is whether these revolutions will succeed in replacing existing regimes by elected/stable governments. In such processes, the first step is the reaction against the regime; the second is having elections; and the third is that the elected government is what the majority of the people expected. Several examples (Nazis in Germany, Hamas in Palestine…) are useful as a caution on what kind of governments an ill prepared democracy can produce.

And here comes the challenge of diverging expectations, whether among the internal factions or most importantly among the newly “liberated” societies and the West, primarily the US.

The West praised most of the region’s dictators for being "friends" and for keeping a firm hand on the Islamists. The so called  policy of supporting “secular dictators[1]”-first against the expansion of communism and then against the danger of radical Islam- resulted in a set of Arab regimes that are dysfunctional, sclerotic, corrupt, humiliated and ruthless.

In its rhetoric, the West constantly supports democracy and fair elections. In fact, it rarely (or never) endorsed the outcome of such a fair a democratic process unless it realized that the outcome of the vote is a pro-Western constituency. The West wanted Algeria to have a democracy back in the 1990s. Then when it looked like the Islamists might win the second round of voting, they supported a military-backed government in suspending elections and crushing the Islamists, causing a civil war that resulted in more than 150000 persons killed. When Palestinians voted for Hamas, the West did not recognize the results. Moreover, the West expects the Arab societies to keep their mouths shut when Israel abuses the Palestinians and often commits serious human rights violations Is the same approach being considered with the new governments in Tunisia, Egypt and eventually Libya, Bahrain, Yemen..etc.?

In 2010, General Raymond Odierno declared that the US “came in naïve about what the problems were in Iraq. I don’t think we understood what I call the societal devastation that occurred…After deposing Saddam Hussein, the US led coalition constructed a political system that ignored class, nationalist and other dynamics in favor of a simple calculus on Sunni, Shiite and Kurds”.  The result of years of US involvement in Iraq is a pro-Iran, corrupt, incompetent and authoritarian government; leading to massive regrets, resentment and sorrow among the Iraqi population.

For the purpose of the exercise, two examples will be taken where failing to understand what happened (Iran-2009) or what is happening (Egypt-2011) could be quite destructive. Both Iran and Egypt play a crucial role in the regional politics and major shifts in their political orientation shape the future of the region in many ways.

Ö        Iran

In 2009, most of the media obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators who were supporters of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents and failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading to other classes and to other areas. When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called out the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the media and the observers failed to understand that the troops would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons. The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society led to the assumption that students at Iran’s elite university somehow spoke for the rest of the country. The cab driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at elite universities. All of this is not to say there are not tremendous tensions within the Iranian political elite. That no revolution broke out does not mean there isn’t a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many of Iran’s religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international risks they don’t want to take. Ahmadinejad’s political popularity in fact rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national security issues. The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme leader, faced a difficult choice in 2009 as he had to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to reverse the election. But as the defender of the regime, Khamenei was afraid that Mousawi supporters’ demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters — both voters and the security forces — had their candidate been denied. Khamenei decided not to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome. The West misunderstood this because they didn’t realize that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them, that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus. The reason the West missed this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election and that it is a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime. So basically, Tehran 2009 was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was the small faction the media kept focusing on — the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways. In Iran, there is a crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite.

Ö        Egypt

In Egypt, power still rests with the same old regime, not with the crowds who never had nearly as much power as many have claimed. In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is risky to consider this a revolution, at least at this stage.

The crowd in Cairo could not have posed a threat without the resentment among the military because of Mubarak’s decision to make his son, Gamal, president of Egypt. This represented a direct challenge to the military who remained the bulwark of the regime. For the last 55 years, all three successive presidents of Egypt were officers in the Egyptian military. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command. The demonstrators demanded — and the military agreed—democratic elections. But there are deeper problems in the democratization of Egypt. First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society. The formation of coherent political parties able to find and run candidates will take a while. Second, the military is deeply involved in running the country. Backing them out of that position will require time. The military bought time but it is not clear that six months is enough time, and it is not clear that, in the end, the military will want to leave the position it has held for more than half a century

During the celebrations after February 11, most songs/slogans were about democracy and Palestine. While the regime committed itself to maintaining the treaty with Israel, the crowds in the square seemed to have other thoughts. The only safe assumption that can be made at this stage is that it is not clear who represent the wishes of 80 million Egyptians.

Practically, the Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy. The only difference is that Egypt was run by one officer whereas now it is run by a group of officers. It is not that nothing happened in Egypt, and it is not that it is not important. It is simply that what happened was not what the media portrayed but a much more complex process. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in what was achieved or how it was achieved. But the number of uncertainties is worrying: what was achieved actually, and what will be the repercussions on Egyptian foreign or domestic policies?

The ideological trend of the region prior to 1978 was secular and socialist. Today it is increasingly Islamist. Egypt is not immune to this trend. So the Egyptian military might find it in its interest to preserve its power by accommodating the Islamists. The demonstrators in Egypt are deeply divided among themselves and the most influential are against a Western-style liberal democracy. It is also not realistic to assume that the Islamists are weaker than Western style liberals. It is even more risky to confuse the Muslim Brotherhood’s caution with weakness. They just toned down their real views, waiting for the right timing.

Ö        Implications

Although the radical Islamist groups did not appear as being the mastermind of the recent uprisings, it is normal that particular groups will try, with greater and lesser success, to take advantage of the new situation. In the present context of the US.-jihadist war, this means that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and gain more power while the West will try to influence the direction of the uprisings to have more liberal pro-Western governments. This will be a major challenge for the West (as outsiders) to play this game compared to native Islamists who know their country.  While there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution(s), this does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Taking control of a revolution is not an easy thing. And the events in Tunisia and Egypt (and previously Iraq) are here to prove that toppling a regime is something but carrying out the process to its very end is a different thing.  Except for the Shias in Bahrain, there is no one on the revolutionary groups enough equipped to take power. In revolutions, the parties that organize themselves during the revolutions are in no position to govern.

So the short term danger is more chaos than radical Islam, followed either by civil war, the military taking control to stabilize the situation, and/or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control. However, on mid to long term, the main challenge would be to deal with anti-Western democratically elected governments, whether moderate or radical.

Iran will probably be losing its lead position of anti-Western contestation as Egypt will soon challenge it. The emergence of a pro-Palestinian Turkey contributed also to destitute Iran from this monopolistic position. At the same time, the struggle for power in Iran is likely to stay within the boundaries of preserving the regime…and Iran’s regional leverage. Iraq and Lebanon (with the new balance of power since January 2011) are almost under Iran’s direct influence. Bahrain might join soon (whether the regime will be toppled or the various groups agree on a new power sharing agreement). The outcomes of the events in Bahrain will also have implications on other Gulf countries with Shia communities (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia…). Basically, Iran will be able to consolidate its regional influence as the result of the recent changes.  Contrary to a widespread perception in the West, the regime in Iran is rational, realistic and result oriented. While many were betting on the ideological considerations to cause divergence between Iran and Hamas, Iran and Syria, Iran and Qatar…etc., the regime of the Mullahs proved to be conscious of this challenge and to be able to overcome it. The same is expected to happen with a radical Sunni new Egypt. Iran will be more than willing to accept and support an Islamist Egypt that acts as an Iranian ally in its “holy” war against Israel.

Therefore, a strengthened anti-Israel (and predominantly anti-West) axis is forming. It might take them some time to clearly define the outline, but the formation process already started.

Under this equation, the new Egypt (whether Islamist or not) will pose a real strategic threat to Israel. Egypt is the center of gravity in the Arab world. This would require a complete reverse of Israel and the U.S. strategies since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel have been the bedrock of Israeli national security. In the wars Israel fought before the accords, a catastrophic outcome for Israel was conceivable. However, the survival of Israel was no longer at stake after 1978. In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the various Palestinian intifadas and the wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, Israeli interests were involved, but not survival. This will change soon.

Ö        Way forward

For Israel, going to the pre-1978 relationship with Egypt without a settlement with the Palestinians would open the door for a potential two-front war with an intifada in the middle. To avoid that, a settlement with the Palestinians seems to be inevitable at this stage.  In the meantime, given the strategic and ideological crosscurrents in Egypt, it is in Israel’s best interest to minimize the perception that Israel is a threat. Israel has to avoid rolling the dice too often, regardless of how strong it thinks it is. Israel needs to lose one war to be on the brink of collapse, no matter how many it already won.

The US (and the West in general) need to do more than self restrain. Based on the above, it is clear that the societies in the MENA countries feel a lot of resentment against the West (especially against the US) due to many historical events but also to misperceptions. It is time for the West to work on these issues and dismiss concerns. This requires long term initiatives/action and a lot of patience. The West should avoid the trap of short term/short sighted political initiatives. They need to analyze the roots of the problems and to build a solid understanding of the societies’ expectations and perceptions. In a nutshell, what is needed is a genuine and efficient confidence building initiative that will help achieving a sustainable and peaceful relationship between the West and the societies in the MENA countries.

At the regional level, the US and the West need to put all efforts into brokering a fair settlement to the Palestinian issue. Failing to do so will further mobilize the Arab masses against the West, this time without the security valve role played by the ousted “secular dictators”.

The West has also to support the domestic process that was started by these uprisings. This can be done by:

·         Fostering a credible, responsible and transparent political establishment. The new political elites need to feel the pressure of accountability. One way to help in this is to make foreign aid contingent on:

o   Commitment of the new governments to a fair/ balanced economic and social development that will eventually lead to the reformation of a middle class

o   Commitment of the new governments  to compliance with  the international Human rights standards

·         Lending support to strengthen the civil society  and state-society relations

·         Building up the armed forces as an independent and professional institution, not a tool for repression.

·         Engaging into counter radicalization and peace building  programs

·         Build the capacity of the new governments to develop core state functions

Lebanese poet Khalil Gibran sounded so accurate when he said: "Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpeting, and farewells him with hooting, only to welcome another with trumpeting again." May this inspire the new “revolutionaries in the region and lead them to draw lessons for the future.

References

·         Mailk H. & Bannerman G.; Lebanon, the peace process and US policy; Policy watch # 265; The Washington Institute for Near East policy; 1997

·         Shadid A.; Iraq’s last patriot; New York Times; 4 February 2011

·         Friedman G.; Revolution and the Muslim World; Geopolitical weekly; Statfor; 22 February 2011

·         Fisk R.; Bloodshed, tears but no democracy; The Independent; 17 January 2011

·         Friedman G.; The Iranian election and the Revolution test; Geopolitical intelligence report; Stratfor; 22 June 2009

·         Friedman G.; Egypt: the distance between enthusiasm and reality; Geopolitical weekly; Stratfor; 13 February 2011

·         Friedman G.; Egypt, Isreal and a strategic reconsideration; Geopolitical weekly; Stratfor; 8 February 2011

·         Friedman G.; The Egypt Crisis in a global context; A special report, Stratfor; 30 January 2011

[1] Vigorously defended by Senator John McCain during his last visit to Lebanon (February 2011)

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