My latest Q&A about Russia's intervention in Syria

Q&A @ US Institute of Peace: Russia's intervention in Syria

Q&A: Russia's Intervention in Syria

www.usip.org  /publications/2015/10/27/qa-russia-s-intervention-in-syria

Russia's military involvement in Syria has further complicated a four-year-long civil war that the United Nations says has killed more than 250,000 people and driven half the population from their homes. Syrian President Bashar al- Assad just visited Moscow, his first trip outside Syria since the conflict began in 2011 - to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Elie Abouaoun, director of Middle East programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, considers the ramifications, the prospects for resolving the conflict and the effect of the various, sometimes contradictory, strategies being pursued by global and regional powers in Syria.

What are the prospects of the U.S. and Russia finding some common ground and shared goals in Syria?

The possibility of the U.S. and Russia working on a common objective will come only when Russia realizes that its move will lead to more violence in Syria rather than to stability. The conflict in Syria is multilayered and dealing with one of its layers unilaterally will trigger hostile reactions from regional powers. Until the Russians understand these likely consequences, I don't see any prospects for a joint framework of cooperation.

How do major players in the region view Russia's intervention?

Many observers in the region interpret the Russian intervention according to their own agenda. It's mostly based on wishful thinking. Some people who are anti-Iranian see Russian involvement as an attempt to curb the expansion of the Iranians in the region. They highlight the conflicting and divergent priorities of Russia in Iran and Syria. Others

who are with Assad see Putin as a savior who can get rid of ISIS and re-establish the reign of Assad.

Where do Russia's intervention and the prospect of a flare up in violence leave America's Arab allies in the region?

Gulf Cooperation Council countries in general, but specifically Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, are heavily involved in supporting opponents of Assad, ranging from Islamist opposition groups to the more moderate rebels.  The problem with this approach is they're pursuing an anti-Iranian agenda without necessarily looking at the consequences of that strategy in the region.

So what has been the consequence for these Arab nations?

T two countries where most of the violence is happening are Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, for example, the Kurdish and Shia areas are relatively stable, but it's the Sunni areas that are most affected by the conflict and suffering most of the destruction. More than 90 percent of the 3 million internally displaced people in Iraq are Sunnis. In Syria, the Alawite region is in a much better situation than the Sunni areas. Even the Kurdish areas are relatively safer, and once again most of the displaced population and refugees are Sunnis. So the strategy the Gulf countries, which are mostly Sunni, are pursuing to fight Iran has not turned out to be the right one even for their own interests. Until they realize that, I can't imagine them engaging constructively to come up with a solution, as the Obama administration is pushing them to do.

How much of the failure of these allies to see the consequences of their approach is due to the U.S. role?

All through the years of heavy engagement in the region, the U.S. didn't work to build up the capacities of its allies and partners. And suddenly, the U.S. decided to disengage politically from the region -- with the military withdrawal from Iraq, for example -- without proper assessment of the implications. It is hard for most governmental institutions in the region to understand the geopolitics and strategy that prompted such a decision. Most local actors don't have the capacity to analyze these kinds of developments geopolitically and to act accordingly. That's why the American disengagement has created a vacuum that regional powers are now competing to fill. Persistence and consistency are the key elements that are missing from the American support for institutions in the region.

What about financial support for the Islamic State and other Islamist groups? Are Gulf States still enabling such support?

There are many indications of the financial and other means of support that ISIS and other Islamist groups receive, mostly through informal channels. There seems to be very little direct channeling of funds from or through governments, but informal support is significant from individuals in the Gulf region to companies and religious foundations.

Why is there no serious effort in the region or internationally to crack down on this support?

The financial support continues because many of the individuals within the establishments of the Gulf monarchies see this money flow as a way of funding the groups that are pressuring the Syrian regime. At the same time, GCC leaders don't want to do anything that acknowledges or legitimizes this kind of support, in part to protect their relations with the West and to avoid the sources of such funding taking root and beginning to challenge their own leadership.

Besides, most of the money is collected by charitable organizations and usually not in large amounts. It's not easy to

track small amounts of money being collected under the umbrella of charities and being channeled to groups in the region.

What about the Iranian nuclear agreement? How do you see that in relation to Iran's role in the region?

The flow of cash to Iran from the lifting of sanctions won't happen overnight. But as long as the Iranians know that they can expect that cash in the coming year or two, they're likely to scale up their support to their proxies and allies in the region. Over the last two years, we have heard complaints from their client groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, about the shortage of financial support. These concerns seem to be easing now.

Does this mean the Iranians will move in a more aggressive way to sweep out their enemies in the region?

I don't think so. Iranian leaders have been quite patient and they know when to strike. For example, in Yemen, they know they are not in a position to win completely, so the Houthis aren't likely to undertake a major campaign. In Syria, they know Assad is not a valid president anymore, so I don't think the flow of money will change the Iranian

strategy there, which is to defend their assets and consolidate rather than attack and expand. Iran also would want to maintain the free flow of weapons and goods to Lebanon, because Hezbollah is Iran's biggest strategic investment in the region.

So you think Iran is playing a long game and slowly bleeding its Arab rivals?

Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, Tehran's aim appears to have been to expand its influence in the region slowly but surely and to back elements that can pressure the monarchies in the Gulf. So if you look at their relations with the Shias in Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, they have developed those kinds of ties over time. Iran's influence over Iraq didn't happen overnight. It took them five to six years to really consolidate their power there. I see them continuing to pursue this strategy in the coming years -- a gradual, slow-motion expansion in the region.

How do you see the situation in Syria playing out? Does a spurt in violence lead Assad to negotiate a political solution?

Given the current mapping of forces in Syria, I'd expect another period of violence before the regime realizes that it can't rule Syria anymore. It would be a game-changer when Bashar al-Assad realizes that his dream of ruling all of Syria as a dictator is impossible.

Comments – Lebanon (waste management) crisis – August 2015 (as of 24 Aug)

Comments Elie Abouaoun – Lebanon (waste management) crisis – August 2015
22 Aug PM	I do not necessarily support the goals of the "Tel3et ri7tkoun" campaign but it is important to denounce the disproportionate use of force during today's demonstration given the nature of the demonstration and the profile of the demonstrators. The security mindset in Lebanon remains regressive and unable to find ways of handling demonstrations without resorting to Assadist methods that they have learned during the Syrian hegemony era. I do hope that the former victims of repression mainly the allies of the Parliament Police will put pressure in the direction of a better management of the situation. Irony of the day: the tear gas used by the security forces is graciously offered by the UK government under a bilateral assistance program. When will the international donors realize the scope of their sins?	لا اشاطر بالضرورة جميع اهداف حملة طلعت ريحتكم لكن لا بد من التنديد بوساءل تفريق المظاهرة الغير متناسبة مع طبيعة التحرك و خلفية الناشطات و الناشطين. لا تزال الذهنية الامنية في لبنان متخلفة و عاجزة عن حفظ الامن دون اللجوء الى مقاربات اسدية عايشوها و تعلموها في ظل الوصاية السورية. كل الامل بان ينتفض كل من عانى من هذه الممارسات و لا سيما حليف الحليف الوصي على شرطة المجلس النيابي اللبناني عله يراف بالمتظاهرين و المتظاهرات. و المضحك ان الغاز المسيل للدموع الذي استعملوه اليوم هو مكرمة من المملكة المتحدة ضمن برنامج تعاون عسكري مع لبنان فمتى يستوعب المانحون الدوليون فداحة خطاياهم؟
23 Aug AM	First it is a must to present those in charge of the shooting, &those who issued the "order to shoot" to a criminal court, as institutional disciplinary sanctions are banal. Second, the political establishment is as accountable as the military one who adopt extreme violence when dealing with communal security challenges. Civil society organizations always sideline the military & police from accountability. Things will never be better as long as the security sector enjoys such an impunity. 3rd, some demonstrators are demanding the resignation of the government; if the last standing constitutional establishment (alas the government) resigns, who will hold elections? who will basically run the show who will deal with the trash crisis (bids)... the implications of such measures are drastic and scary	اولا لا بد من محاسبة جزاءية لمطلقي النار و مصدري الاوامر فالعقوبات المسلكية مهزلة يجب ان تتوقف  ثانيا ان مسؤولية السلطة السياسية هي متساوية مع مسؤولية القيادات الامنية التي غالبا ما تلجأ للعنف المفرط في معالجة تحديات تتعلق بالأمن المجتمعي. يخطأ المجتمع المدني بانه دائما يحيد العسكر من المحاسبة. لن تستقيم الامور طالما القطاع الامني يتمتع بالافلات من العقاب ثالثا اذا سقطت اخر مؤسسة دستورية اليوم من يجري الانتخابات؟ و من يسير امور البلد و ماذا يحصل بالنفايات؟ فمطالب بعض المتظاهرين خيالية و قاتلة
23 Aug PM	Who said that opening the bids (of waste management offers) will solve the problem of waste management? The 2 determining factors are sorting at household level AND getting rid of the NIMBY (not in my backyard) when it comes to landfills for organic waste. so the goal of demonstrations should be the society itself that you pretend representing, not the regime itself because irrespective of its nature will remain unable to do any real reform as long as the society does not uphold its responsibility	من قال ان فض العروض يفض مشكلة النفايات؟ هذه مشكلة المجتمع الذين تدعون تمثيله اذ ان مفتاحي الحل هما الفرز عند المصدر و التخلي عن عقلية "ليس في باحة داري" فيما يتعلق بطمر النفايات العضوية اذا هدف المظاهرات يجب ان يكون الناس انفسهم و ليس النظام الذي مهما كانت طبيعته سيبقى عاجزا عن اي اصلاح فعلي في ظل مجتمع لا يعي مسؤوليت
24 Aug 15	1.       The death of Mr. Reda Taleb, one of the protestors, as a result of a head injury during yesterday’s demonstrations should lead to a judicial and public prosecution of the aggressors. The presence of CCTV cameras in the area and the fact that the thugs did not cover their faces, neutralizes all alibis that security and judicial authorities usually mention to justify the interruption or diversion of investigations. Looking forward to reading the conclusions of the investigations and to seeing the aggressors before a court of law. 2.       The organizers of the campaign “Tel3et Ri7etkoun” (You Stink) called their follow citizens to join their campaign “on the condition that they are not affiliated to politicians or religious groups”. I am not affiliated to any party but I disagree with this exclusionist (aka Takfiri) mindset.  Insisting on excluding large parts of the society will keep the campaign confined to few hundreds of activists. However, such reform campaigns should attract the largest number of people from all political, religious, ideological, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. It is obvious that the “Daesh-ISIS mentality” is expanding everywhere, even among people who pretend to fight it.	1.       وفاة المتظاهر رضا طالب متأثرا باصابت في الرأس خلال التحرك يوم أمس يستدعي مساءلة عدلية و علنية للمعتدين. ان كثرة الكاميرات في منطقة التحرك و وصول طوابير من المشاغبين و هم مكشوفي الوجوه يسحب أي ذريعة من القوى الأمنية و الأجهزة القضاءية. كلنا بانتظار نتائج التحقيق و احالة المتورطين الى القضاء. 2.       عجيب أمر منظمي حملة "طلعت ريحتكن" اذ انهم يدعون المواطنين الى الانضمام الى التحرك و لكن يشترطون عليهم أن يكونوا "غير تابعين لأحزاب أو لطوائف". أنا لا أنتمي لأي حزب و لكن لماذا هذا العقل التكفيري الغير مجدي أذ ان اصرارهم على اقصاء فئات كبيرة من الشعب سوف يبقي التحرك محصورا في بضعة مئات من الناشطين و الناشطات. هكذا تحرك اصلاحي يجب أن يستقطب أكبر شريحة ممكنة من الشعب بجميع أطيافه السياسية و الذهبية و اليديولوجية و الأثنية و الثقافية. يظهر جليا أن العقلية الداعشية تتمدد حتى في أوساط من يدعون مواجهتها

My Brief Commentary about Death Penalty in Lebanon on MTV Lebanon News

My Brief Commentary about Death Penalty in Lebanon on MTV Lebanon News

Beating the Islamic State Won’t Fix Iraq .

Beating the Islamic State Won’t Fix Iraq .

By Dr. Elie Abouaoun

Published in the "Foreign Policy" on July 8th, 2015. 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/08/beating-the-islamic-state-wont-fix-iraq/

The country's extremist problem goes way beyond ISIS. And unless the state fixes its governance troubles, it will have to fight this war all over again

Last spring, it would have been difficult for the world to imagine large chunks of Iraq falling into the hands of the Islamic State. But the group’s presence — through the fall of Mosul, its expansion into Syria’s civil war, and its claiming responsibility for attacks around the world — has all but become the singular representation of Muslim radicalism, even though it has only commanded the world’s attention for just over a year. The circumstances that incubate this kind of ideological radicalization, however, are much older than the Islamic State — and they will almost surely outlast it. Unless the Iraqi government, with the help of the international community, is able to engage in legitimate state development and governance in the region, militant extremism will continue to rush in and fill the resulting social and political vacuums.

The U.S.-led military campaign — despite some successes — has struggled to push the group back. To actually help Iraq defeat the Islamic State, however, the United States needs to diversify its approach. Fighting the kind of radicalization epitomized by the Islamic State means addressing the base problem: the lack of legitimate governance structures that provide citizens with opportunities for prosperity. Iraq cannot achieve this level of legitimacy without help and investment in the country’s economic and social infrastructure. If the United States wants Iraq to overcome this challenge, it needs to help Iraqis rebuild an inclusive governance model as well as educational and economic opportunities in a way that benefits all constituents — or face the possibility of groups violently fracturing off to tend to the needs that their government cannot.

Though the Islamic State is the current enemy, the problem Iraq is fighting has deep roots. The Middle East is no stranger to ideologies that use Islam as justification for political violence. Before the Islamic State, there was al Qaeda. It, in turn, was preceded by the often forgotten radical Islamist groups that splintered off from the Muslim Brotherhood some decades ago, such as the Takfir wal-hijra, loosely translated as “excommunication and exodus.” So-called takfiri organizations like these — in Arabic, the term literally means the act of excommunication — have proliferated throughout the region. They have no official bond but share a common tendency to cast anyone who doesn’t subscribe to a particular insular ideology as an infidel target. The Islamic State is just the latest — if not, most successful — incarnation of this phenomenon. And it is the ideology incubating these extremist groups that must truly be defeated in Iraq and the Arab region.

A military strategy alone can only achieve short-term goals on the ground — what the Iraqi state needs to make those gains stick is national legitimacy.

***

Weak states like Iraq function as petri dishes for extremism. The Islamic State has been able to draw recruits from local and international civilian populations at least in part because they are able portray themselves as upholders of righteousness when cast alongside the corrupt, authoritarian governments. The states’ lack of legitimacy drives people into the arms of extremist ideology.

The more extreme pressure on civilians becomes, the more they flock to groups like the Islamic State.

Even so, the Islamic State has proven itself uniquely adept at recruiting. According to CNN, the CIA estimates that there are between 20,000 and 32,000 Islamic State fighters. And though U.S. intelligence officials estimated in early June that the U.S.-led bombing campaign alone has killed more than 10,000 Islamic State troops, experts estimate that foreign recruits have more than made up for those lost. In a May report, the United Nations estimated that more than 25,000 foreigners had travelled to join militant Islamist groups worldwide. This ability to suck in civilian recruits wasn’t nearly as apparent in, say, post- 2003 Iraq, when sectarian insurgents were at each other’s throats. Nor was it as rampant when al Qaeda was at its operational zenith in the years leading up to 9/11. The Islamic State’s ability to acquire and control territory — an accomplishment that has to do with active or tacit support from local populations — helped fuel this recruitment.

Still, the simple reality is that the situation in Iraq has grown dire for many civilians, and the Islamic State has continually been able to exploit the sectarian cracks that have crept across the country. Sunni Muslims have been dealing with social and political marginalization since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which paved the way for the Shiite majority to acquire political control. In more recent years, indiscriminate violence

by Iraqi military forces became a prime reason for local civilians to turn to the Islamic State, according to Iraq-based journalist Mohammed al-Dulaimy.

The military strategy against the terrorist group has included the elevation of anti-Islamic State militant groups in the area — a security-centered approach that has led to unhelpful cycles of regional and local violence. Regional conflicts have divided into local conflicts, and more and more civilian communities are being militarized. The collapse of the Iraqi Army last summer in several key battles has led such militias, many with Iranian, Kurdish, or Turkish backing, to fill the security vacuum, which introduced an extra dimension of sectarian complication.

Kurdish groups and the Iranian-backed Shiite militias who are fighting against the Islamic State are now responsible for a good portion of sectarian violence in both Syria and Iraq. Shiite militias entering traditionally Sunni areas of Iraq, for instance, has resulted in further unrest, despite their supposed anti- Islamic State mandate. Western support for supposedly moderate militias fighting against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces has exacerbated sectarian rifts, as these militias have engaged in reprisal attacks against Sunnis.

The Yazidis of Iraq (mainly in the Mount Sinjar area) started to take revenge after being pillaged by the Islamic State last summer and violence against Assyrian Christians in northeast Syria and the Coptic Christians in Libya has prompted Christian fanatics to travel from overseas to “protect” their religious brethren. The Iraqi Christians of Assyrian descent, who have also suffered under the rise of the Islamic State, have even taken to crowdfunding to bolster their retaliatory efforts. In many cases, civilians are being armed and trained to fight. For instance, pro-Kurdish forces are training Yazidis and other groups in Iraq against the Islamic State, while pro-Shiite factions are training Shabaks, another ethnic and cultural minority in Iraq, and other Shiite Iraqis to do the same. This regional dynamic can facilitate a future where different sectarian or ethnic militias will resort to violence to achieve political goals with the support of larger regional powers like Iran, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia. This is a recipe for more instability.

If the world hopes to dial down this kind of local and regional sectarian-based violence, there needs to be a strategy — by both international and regional powers — working alongside the current security-centric plan. This cooling effect is impossible at the present pace of local militarization, often carried out along political and sectarian lines.

***

Counterbalancing the forces that seem to be destabilizing and reorienting the Middle East demands a comprehensive strategy that bolsters institutions of education and social security, which can improve the economic inequality and lack of upward mobility in much of the region. This, however, needs to be done in a way that is suitably tailored to the characteristics of each country. So far, the proposed approach of cross-sectarian nation states adheres too much to secular Western social standards, which are often impractical and unpalatable for the region’s populations. Moreover, the West has a credibility problem that it has to overcome.

To begin with, policymakers in the West would do well to reconsider their alliances with certain authoritarian states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which have strategic agendas that don’t always align with the United States. Not only does this foster cynicism among civilians, it also directly facilitates regional instability and violence by way of a highly perceivable double standard. Iraqis also balk at what they see as a double standard regarding how the world seems to legitimize sectarian militias in Syria that are anti-Assad but label similar groups in Iraq as “terrorists.” The alleged GCC-based funding of anti-Assad militias in Syria is a good example of this mismanagement, as a substantial portion of its funding went to extremist groups, which helped exacerbate the Islamic State problem next door.

Secondly, consistent militarization of localities and civilians will result in heightened radicalization. The United States and other countries should start cutting off the flow of weapons into places like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Libya, though the genie is out of the bottle by now.

The offspring of Iraqi insurgents in post-2003 Iraq will come of age and possibly continue the same fighting that their fathers engaged in unless the region’s governments start taking their citizenry more seriously by transitioning into truly representative democracies and implementing measures that benefit everyone, regardless of sect or ethnicity. None of this can be done through forceful foreign imposition, which makes ethno-sectarian divisions even more dangerous and perhaps more capable of sparking radicalization. The question of how Islam might play a role in state-building must also be addressed.

Managing sectarianism means the facilitation of moderation. This can be done by providing a platform for mainstream Muslim scholars to project their voices in public discourse. One example is Mauritania’s Abdullah bin Bayyah, who has long advocated the resolution of sectarian differences within the global Muslim community.

Western nations must reconsider their priorities in a way that helps restore regional legitimacy to states and protects people during conflict while enhancing their quality of life in peacetime. This means pouring more resources into areas like educational and economic development, all done in a way that bolsters inclusive and peaceful coexistence in a diverse society. Investment in inclusive governance and development will go a long way in terms of building a government’s legitimacy, which has long been a problem for the Middle East. New leaders must also embody this new legitimacy by voicing a willingness from the state to address issues like human rights and economic inequality. Without these strategies to complement a military plan, it will be impossible to prevent further violence from animating the region for a long time to come. A Middle East with even more sectarian violence than exists today is the kind of nightmare scenario that the world should do everything to prevent.