Syria’s
refugee crisis: the unseen end of the tunnel
Published in the PHAP newsletter (Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection)
Dr. Elie Abouaoun
Executive Director
Arab Human Rights Fund
February 2013
Syria has been in
turmoil since early 2011. However, the escalation witnessed in the last weeks
indicates a change in the nature of the military actions, with considerable and
overt implications for civilians. Not only is the geographical area affected by
the conflict larger now, but also more deadly weapons are in use and more
intense fights are commonly reported. As always, the civilian population is
paying the price: we have an estimated death toll of 60,000 persons, 1.2
million internally displaced, and around 600,000 refugees, mainly in Jordan,
Turkey, and Lebanon but also in smaller numbers in other countries, such as
Iraq and Egypt.
The international
community has intensified its efforts to address the most urgent humanitarian
needs of the conflict-affected population inside Syria and in the neighboring
countries where refugees have sought safe haven. Given the likely timeframe of
the crisis, and the likelihood of refugees returning, is this enough?
Realizing
the plight’s timeframe is key
As in other similar crises,
the complexity of the situation becomes more apparent when trying to envisage
durable solutions rather than responding to the current humanitarian needs.
While the outcome of the ongoing conflict remains unclear, the Syrian refugee
crisis is likely to persist for some time. The fact that the military
operations in Syria are increasing will further complicate the situation,
leading to more displacement, more destruction, and a larger scar in the Syrian
social fabric.
Syria’s neighboring
countries have received hundreds of thousands of refugees, which has further
strained their limited resources. Most of these countries already suffer from
significant economic, infrastructural, political, social, and governance-related
problems. Most importantly, these countries experience challenges in managing
the diversity already existing within them, such as religious and ethnic differences
in the cases of Iraq and Turkey, religious differences in Lebanon, and the
West/East bank divide in Jordan. Therefore the problem posed by the large
numbers of Syrian refugees is not only of an economic nature, but has
implications for the existing political and demographic balances in each country.
This reality does not
justify the hostile statements encountered from time to time in the media. While
concerns related to the absorption capacity of each nearby country are
legitimate, they are no excuse for non-compliance with the International Protection Regime of Refugees.
The governments of Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have a legal
obligation to comply. A certain margin of maneuver exists for these governments
when discussing durable solutions to this crisis with the international
community. But in the meantime, Syrian refugees should be granted unconditional
access to safe havens and provided the necessary protection during their
displacement.
While host
countries have to provide adequate services and protection, the international
community holds the much larger responsibility to assist these countries in
their efforts to identify durable solutions for the thousands of families that might
not be able to go back to their areas of origin as soon as most people initially
thought. Thus, the primary aim of international donors at this stage should not
be to flood host countries with money for material assistance. Instead, they
need to start seriously working on adequate durable solutions to alleviate the
burden put on these countries.
Past experiences
from Iraq and other operations are not encouraging. In many cases, the
international community has failed in its responsibilities to facilitate the
design and ensure timely implementation of durable solutions. Simply put,
assuming that there will be a massive return of refugees to Syria in the near
future is not a good bet. And very little, if anything, is apparently being done
by donors, international agencies, and host countries to address this
situation.
Why
people will think twice before returning
The spontaneous
answer of most Syrian refugees would be that the only viable solution for them
is to return home; very few of them realize the bitter reality that this will
not happen soon.
First and
foremost, in order to take a decision to return, refugees need to feel that
their security and safety will be ensured. And here, one should not mistake the
general security situation with the “perception of individual safety” that each
refugee has to feel in order to return. There are a number of factors that will
make security one of the major challenges for years to come: the evolution of
the military operations, which now involve most of the Syrian regions, the
scale of the killings, the chaotic proliferation of weapons, and the extreme
polarization in the country, which currently divides according to whether you
are pro- or anti-Assad as well as whether you are for or against an Islamic
regime for the post Assad era
On the other hand,
the infrastructure in Syria was already obsolete before the conflict. With the
large scale destruction, protracted conflict, and the guerilla war currently
going on, it is clear that Syria’s infrastructure would require, in the best
case scenario, several years to be rehabilitated. Even before 2011, the
economic situation in Syria was quite bad. Given the scarcity of resources in
the country, major economic improvements are not expected until relative
stability is reached and structural reforms to an archaic state-run economic
system are implemented. Such reforms need several years to start having an
impact. The speed of economic development in Syria will have a major impact on the
return of refugees.
A
protracted crisis
All signs
indicate that the Syrian refugee crisis will become protracted. If this becomes
the case, returning to their areas of origin will become a less viable option
for most of the displaced. This will mean that some of them will stay in their host
countries while some returnees and the IDPs will find themselves in a situation
of secondary displacement inside Syria. With time, there will be more and more
reasons why people will feel reluctant to go back home. Such predictions have implications
for the way the return process should be planned and financed.
At the donor
level, considering the crisis as a short-term humanitarian emergency would be
shortsighted. Syria will require a long-term investment from donors that should
not focus primarily on the economic aspects but instead mainly on the political
and social aspects.
Any return
movement will be conditioned by the future political
demographics of the country, including the formation of religious, sectarian,
or ethnically homogenous sub-regions, whether they are virtual or physical. The
way in which an eventual political process is put in place and the level to
which it will be inclusive is also a determining factor, together with
considerations related to security, infrastructure, and economic opportunities.
On another
level, the return process will also be conditioned by the general political,
economic, and security situation in the already vulnerable host countries, as
well as their willingness and capacity to keep large numbers of refugees on
their territories and the levels of funding provided by the international
community.
Concluding
note
The outstanding question
today is whether the international community and the specialized refugee
agencies will be able to draw lessons from previous displacement crises and
design a proper strategy for this complex situation in a highly volatile
environment. The starting point is to capture the timeframe of this crisis in a
realistic manner. Will things be different this time?