Not published
Ö Introductory note
This paper is not meant to be a thorough analysis or to bring answers to complex questions. It was written more as a food for thought about major and almost unprecedented political developments in the region.
Ö The context
The MENA region has experienced an unprecedented wave of unrest since January 2011. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the region witnessed a tremendous amount of coups, revolutions…etc. to replace regimes and monarchies supported by the “colonial” and “imperial” powers. This trend almost stabilized since the 1970s -with the exception of Iran in 1979. The regimes created during this period, and the personalities behind them, managed to achieve relative stability in their countries, at the expense of human rights, democratic transition of power, economic and social development….etc. In brief, what emerged throughout the region were regimes run by kleptocrat-dictators. Several questions come-up as a result of the recent developments: what are the dynamics behind the 2011 uprisings, what will be the impact on the societies of these countries, who will take advantage of the induced change, and what the broader implications on the region are.
Ö Expectations & perceptions
The movements arose from country specific conditions and do not seem to be a vast conspiracy with a single perpetrator or agenda. In Tunisia and Egypt where the social structure is more or less homogenous, the main trigger was the harsh socio economic conditions in a context of a dictatorship and the target was the “ruling family”. In countries where vertical divisions exist (Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan…), the dynamics are completely different; it is more a struggle for power between political/religious/tribal groups. Lybia might be a hybrid situation where both elements co-exist.
The real issue is whether these revolutions will succeed in replacing existing regimes by elected/stable governments. In such processes, the first step is the reaction against the regime; the second is having elections; and the third is that the elected government is what the majority of the people expected. Several examples (Nazis in Germany, Hamas in Palestine…) are useful as a caution on what kind of governments an ill prepared democracy can produce.
And here comes the challenge of diverging expectations, whether among the internal factions or most importantly among the newly “liberated” societies and the West, primarily the US.
The West praised most of the region’s dictators for being "friends" and for keeping a firm hand on the Islamists. The so called policy of supporting “secular dictators[1]”-first against the expansion of communism and then against the danger of radical Islam- resulted in a set of Arab regimes that are dysfunctional, sclerotic, corrupt, humiliated and ruthless.
In its rhetoric, the West constantly supports democracy and fair elections. In fact, it rarely (or never) endorsed the outcome of such a fair a democratic process unless it realized that the outcome of the vote is a pro-Western constituency. The West wanted Algeria to have a democracy back in the 1990s. Then when it looked like the Islamists might win the second round of voting, they supported a military-backed government in suspending elections and crushing the Islamists, causing a civil war that resulted in more than 150000 persons killed. When Palestinians voted for Hamas, the West did not recognize the results. Moreover, the West expects the Arab societies to keep their mouths shut when Israel abuses the Palestinians and often commits serious human rights violations Is the same approach being considered with the new governments in Tunisia, Egypt and eventually Libya, Bahrain, Yemen..etc.?
In 2010, General Raymond Odierno declared that the US “came in naïve about what the problems were in Iraq. I don’t think we understood what I call the societal devastation that occurred…After deposing Saddam Hussein, the US led coalition constructed a political system that ignored class, nationalist and other dynamics in favor of a simple calculus on Sunni, Shiite and Kurds”. The result of years of US involvement in Iraq is a pro-Iran, corrupt, incompetent and authoritarian government; leading to massive regrets, resentment and sorrow among the Iraqi population.
For the purpose of the exercise, two examples will be taken where failing to understand what happened (Iran-2009) or what is happening (Egypt-2011) could be quite destructive. Both Iran and Egypt play a crucial role in the regional politics and major shifts in their political orientation shape the future of the region in many ways.
Ö Iran
In 2009, most of the media obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators who were supporters of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents and failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading to other classes and to other areas. When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called out the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the media and the observers failed to understand that the troops would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons. The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society led to the assumption that students at Iran’s elite university somehow spoke for the rest of the country. The cab driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at elite universities. All of this is not to say there are not tremendous tensions within the Iranian political elite. That no revolution broke out does not mean there isn’t a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many of Iran’s religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international risks they don’t want to take. Ahmadinejad’s political popularity in fact rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national security issues. The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme leader, faced a difficult choice in 2009 as he had to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to reverse the election. But as the defender of the regime, Khamenei was afraid that Mousawi supporters’ demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters — both voters and the security forces — had their candidate been denied. Khamenei decided not to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome. The West misunderstood this because they didn’t realize that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them, that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus. The reason the West missed this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election and that it is a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime. So basically, Tehran 2009 was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was the small faction the media kept focusing on — the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways. In Iran, there is a crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite.
Ö Egypt
In Egypt, power still rests with the same old regime, not with the crowds who never had nearly as much power as many have claimed. In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is risky to consider this a revolution, at least at this stage.
The crowd in Cairo could not have posed a threat without the resentment among the military because of Mubarak’s decision to make his son, Gamal, president of Egypt. This represented a direct challenge to the military who remained the bulwark of the regime. For the last 55 years, all three successive presidents of Egypt were officers in the Egyptian military. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command. The demonstrators demanded — and the military agreed—democratic elections. But there are deeper problems in the democratization of Egypt. First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society. The formation of coherent political parties able to find and run candidates will take a while. Second, the military is deeply involved in running the country. Backing them out of that position will require time. The military bought time but it is not clear that six months is enough time, and it is not clear that, in the end, the military will want to leave the position it has held for more than half a century
During the celebrations after February 11, most songs/slogans were about democracy and Palestine. While the regime committed itself to maintaining the treaty with Israel, the crowds in the square seemed to have other thoughts. The only safe assumption that can be made at this stage is that it is not clear who represent the wishes of 80 million Egyptians.
Practically, the Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy. The only difference is that Egypt was run by one officer whereas now it is run by a group of officers. It is not that nothing happened in Egypt, and it is not that it is not important. It is simply that what happened was not what the media portrayed but a much more complex process. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in what was achieved or how it was achieved. But the number of uncertainties is worrying: what was achieved actually, and what will be the repercussions on Egyptian foreign or domestic policies?
The ideological trend of the region prior to 1978 was secular and socialist. Today it is increasingly Islamist. Egypt is not immune to this trend. So the Egyptian military might find it in its interest to preserve its power by accommodating the Islamists. The demonstrators in Egypt are deeply divided among themselves and the most influential are against a Western-style liberal democracy. It is also not realistic to assume that the Islamists are weaker than Western style liberals. It is even more risky to confuse the Muslim Brotherhood’s caution with weakness. They just toned down their real views, waiting for the right timing.
Ö Implications
Although the radical Islamist groups did not appear as being the mastermind of the recent uprisings, it is normal that particular groups will try, with greater and lesser success, to take advantage of the new situation. In the present context of the US.-jihadist war, this means that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and gain more power while the West will try to influence the direction of the uprisings to have more liberal pro-Western governments. This will be a major challenge for the West (as outsiders) to play this game compared to native Islamists who know their country. While there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution(s), this does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Taking control of a revolution is not an easy thing. And the events in Tunisia and Egypt (and previously Iraq) are here to prove that toppling a regime is something but carrying out the process to its very end is a different thing. Except for the Shias in Bahrain, there is no one on the revolutionary groups enough equipped to take power. In revolutions, the parties that organize themselves during the revolutions are in no position to govern.
So the short term danger is more chaos than radical Islam, followed either by civil war, the military taking control to stabilize the situation, and/or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control. However, on mid to long term, the main challenge would be to deal with anti-Western democratically elected governments, whether moderate or radical.
Iran will probably be losing its lead position of anti-Western contestation as Egypt will soon challenge it. The emergence of a pro-Palestinian Turkey contributed also to destitute Iran from this monopolistic position. At the same time, the struggle for power in Iran is likely to stay within the boundaries of preserving the regime…and Iran’s regional leverage. Iraq and Lebanon (with the new balance of power since January 2011) are almost under Iran’s direct influence. Bahrain might join soon (whether the regime will be toppled or the various groups agree on a new power sharing agreement). The outcomes of the events in Bahrain will also have implications on other Gulf countries with Shia communities (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia…). Basically, Iran will be able to consolidate its regional influence as the result of the recent changes. Contrary to a widespread perception in the West, the regime in Iran is rational, realistic and result oriented. While many were betting on the ideological considerations to cause divergence between Iran and Hamas, Iran and Syria, Iran and Qatar…etc., the regime of the Mullahs proved to be conscious of this challenge and to be able to overcome it. The same is expected to happen with a radical Sunni new Egypt. Iran will be more than willing to accept and support an Islamist Egypt that acts as an Iranian ally in its “holy” war against Israel.
Therefore, a strengthened anti-Israel (and predominantly anti-West) axis is forming. It might take them some time to clearly define the outline, but the formation process already started.
Under this equation, the new Egypt (whether Islamist or not) will pose a real strategic threat to Israel. Egypt is the center of gravity in the Arab world. This would require a complete reverse of Israel and the U.S. strategies since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel have been the bedrock of Israeli national security. In the wars Israel fought before the accords, a catastrophic outcome for Israel was conceivable. However, the survival of Israel was no longer at stake after 1978. In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the various Palestinian intifadas and the wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, Israeli interests were involved, but not survival. This will change soon.
Ö Way forward
For Israel, going to the pre-1978 relationship with Egypt without a settlement with the Palestinians would open the door for a potential two-front war with an intifada in the middle. To avoid that, a settlement with the Palestinians seems to be inevitable at this stage. In the meantime, given the strategic and ideological crosscurrents in Egypt, it is in Israel’s best interest to minimize the perception that Israel is a threat. Israel has to avoid rolling the dice too often, regardless of how strong it thinks it is. Israel needs to lose one war to be on the brink of collapse, no matter how many it already won.
The US (and the West in general) need to do more than self restrain. Based on the above, it is clear that the societies in the MENA countries feel a lot of resentment against the West (especially against the US) due to many historical events but also to misperceptions. It is time for the West to work on these issues and dismiss concerns. This requires long term initiatives/action and a lot of patience. The West should avoid the trap of short term/short sighted political initiatives. They need to analyze the roots of the problems and to build a solid understanding of the societies’ expectations and perceptions. In a nutshell, what is needed is a genuine and efficient confidence building initiative that will help achieving a sustainable and peaceful relationship between the West and the societies in the MENA countries.
At the regional level, the US and the West need to put all efforts into brokering a fair settlement to the Palestinian issue. Failing to do so will further mobilize the Arab masses against the West, this time without the security valve role played by the ousted “secular dictators”.
The West has also to support the domestic process that was started by these uprisings. This can be done by:
· Fostering a credible, responsible and transparent political establishment. The new political elites need to feel the pressure of accountability. One way to help in this is to make foreign aid contingent on:
o Commitment of the new governments to a fair/ balanced economic and social development that will eventually lead to the reformation of a middle class
o Commitment of the new governments to compliance with the international Human rights standards
· Lending support to strengthen the civil society and state-society relations
· Building up the armed forces as an independent and professional institution, not a tool for repression.
· Engaging into counter radicalization and peace building programs
· Build the capacity of the new governments to develop core state functions
Lebanese poet Khalil Gibran sounded so accurate when he said: "Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpeting, and farewells him with hooting, only to welcome another with trumpeting again." May this inspire the new “revolutionaries in the region and lead them to draw lessons for the future.
References
· Mailk H. & Bannerman G.; Lebanon, the peace process and US policy; Policy watch # 265; The Washington Institute for Near East policy; 1997
· Shadid A.; Iraq’s last patriot; New York Times; 4 February 2011
· Friedman G.; Revolution and the Muslim World; Geopolitical weekly; Statfor; 22 February 2011
· Fisk R.; Bloodshed, tears but no democracy; The Independent; 17 January 2011
· Friedman G.; The Iranian election and the Revolution test; Geopolitical intelligence report; Stratfor; 22 June 2009
· Friedman G.; Egypt: the distance between enthusiasm and reality; Geopolitical weekly; Stratfor; 13 February 2011
· Friedman G.; Egypt, Isreal and a strategic reconsideration; Geopolitical weekly; Stratfor; 8 February 2011
· Friedman G.; The Egypt Crisis in a global context; A special report, Stratfor; 30 January 2011
