عشرة أفكار عن موضوع التمديد / Ten thoughts about the extension of the Lebanese Parliament’s mandate (english and arabic)

عشرة أفكار عن موضوع التمديد

سألني البعض لماذا لم أعلق بعد على قانون تمديد مجلس النواب اللبناني. الجواب انني كنت استجمع قواي بعد طعنة جديدة ولعلها ليست الأخيرة للحياة الديمقراطية في لبنان. لقد سمعت وقرأت الكثير-شأني شأن الكثير من اللبنانيين -من التعليقات المناهضة للتمديد أو المبررة له. رأيي المتواضع يتلخص بما يلي:

1-    ان قرار التمديد جاء نتيجة قرار إقليمي مرده الى عدم رغبة القوى السنية الإقليمية تكريس تراجع متوقع لحلفائهم انتخابيا في ضوء التنامي السريع للحركة الإسلامية المتطرفة في المنطقة وتراجع الحيثية المسماة "معتدلة" كما والى عدم قدرة إيران وحلفائها اللبنانيين على إدارة معركة انتخابية في ظل انشغالهم في المعركة السورية. تلاقت المصلحة السنية الشيعية على التمديد ونحرت الديمقراطية على يد قوى سنية وشيعية بتواطؤ – عن قصد أو غير قصد – بعض القوى المسيحية من الطرفين (القوات اللبنانية وتيار المردة) فيما وقفت قوى المسيحية الأخرى (التيار الوطني الحر والكتائب) في موقف العاجز عن التأثير في مواقف حلفائهم.

2-    إذا قرار التمديد ليس له علاقة لا بأسباب أمنية ولا بالاشتباك الرئاسي. هذه كلها أسباب تم اختلاقها لتبرير القرار ليس الا.

3-    بغض النظر عن رأي البعض من موقف التيار الوطني الحر من الانتخابات الرئاسية، ان ربط التمديد بهذا الموقف ليس واقعيا ومناورة واضحة تهدف الى تحوير الانتباه عن الأسباب الحقيقية وراء قرار التمديد أي كلمة السر السعودية وتلاقي المصلحة – الموضوعي-مع حزب الله في هذا الموضوع

4-    لا بد من التذكير بأن التمديد الأول حصل عندما كان الرئيس سليمان لا يزال يمارس مهامه فكيف يكون اليوم عدم انتخاب رئيس هو ما حتم السير بالتمديد؟ لماذا لم تتم الانتخابات قبل سنة؟

5-    لا بد أن يستخلص التيار الوطني الحر وحزب الكتائب العبرة من واقعة سير حلفاءهم بالتمديد غير ابهين برأيهم المناهض. فالتحالفات السياسية لا يجب أن تكون باتجاه واحد بل أن تعكس تلاقي على أجندة سياسية واضحة. والا يصبح الموضوع خدعة ليس أكثر.

6-    اما الكذبة الأكبر فهي أن التمديد سببه الوضع الأمني والحرب في سوريا. كلنا يعلم أن هذه الحرب مرشحة أن تطول لسنوات وأن مكافحة الإرهاب عملية طويلة لا تنتهي. هل هذا يعني ان نبقي على نفس المجلس النيابي لعشرة سنوات مثلا؟

7-    أما فيما يخص الحراك المدني لم يكن مفاجئا ألا يستطيع تجنيد سوى حفنة من الناشطين. عندما تكون أغلبية الشعب اللبناني فاسدة وعنصرية وغير متبنيه لقيم حقوق الانسان فلا مجال للاتكال على الرأي العام في مواجهة ممارسات لا تعتبرها هذه الأغلبية خطأ في الأساس

8-    اما المفاجأة في هذا الموضوع فهو استذكار "المجتمع المدني" من قبل أطرافا ما برحت ابرز اقطابها في مهاجمته منهجيا. يبدو أن ذاكرة الوزير سليم جريصاتي خانته عندما دعا المجتمع المدني الى التحرك. هل أصبح اليوم المجتمع المدني شريكا جيدا والبارحة كان نفس المجتمع المدني شرا مطلقا؟ هل يكون عمل المجتمع المدني مشبوها في مواضيع ومرحبا به في مواضيع أخرى؟ هل أصبح الناشطون سلاحا غب الطلب نستعمله متى يحلو لنا و "نشيطنه" في مناسبات أخرى؟

9-     ان الارتكاز الى المواثيق الدولية من قبل بعض مناهضي التمديد هو أيضا مخزي في وقت لم تتوقف نفس هذه الوجوه السياسية عن نعت نفس المنظومة القانونية التي يبخرون اليوم بأبشع الأوصاف وبشكل منهجي.

10-                    تبقى المحصلة النهائية أن قرار التمديد ينسجم تماما مع منظومة قيم غالبية اللبنانيين المناهضة لقيم الكرامة الإنسانية والحرية والمساواة والتي تعكسها طبقة سياسية فاسدة أخلاقيا ليصح المثل القائل "كما أنتم يولى عليكم". فكفوا عن التباكي وعيدوا النظر بقيمكم قبل القاء اللوم على الأخرين. دود الخل منو وفيه.

10  thoughts about the extension of the Lebanese Parliament’s mandate

Some people asked me why I did not comment yet on the decision to extend the mandate of the current Lebanese parliament. The truth is that I was trying to recover from another hard blow to the democratic practices in Lebanon; apparently not the last one. As most of the Lebanese, I have been reading and watching many “theories” about this decision. Below are few thoughts:

1-     The decision to extend the mandate of the Lebanese Parliament came as a result of a decision by regional Sunni powers not to live up to the reality of the decline of their influence as a result of the rampant radicalization AND to the lack of capacity of Iran and its Lebanese allies to engage in such elections while they are busy fighting in Syria. The interests of regional powers converged this time at the expense of democracy in Lebanon and led to a decision that the Christian parties had to accept. This how we ended up having political foes (Lebanese Forces and Marada) endorse the extension while others (Free Patriotic Movement and the Kataeb) were powerless in front of their respective allies.

2-     The extension decision has nothing to do with the security problems in Lebanon nor with the incapacity of the Parliament to elect a new President.

3-     Irrespective of the opinion about the Free Patriotic Movement’s stand on Presidential elections, the reality is that the extension has nothing to do with this stand. Linking the two is not realistic. Furthermore, it is a political maneuver to divert attention from the real reasons i.e. the Saudi decision and the objective convergence of the Iranian-Saudi interests.

4-     It is worth reminding that the first extension in 2013 as voted while President Suleiman was still in office. Why is it not possible today to hold elections? Why didn’t we have elections last year?

5-     It is very important for both the Free patriotic Movement and the Kataeb to draw the relevant conclusions from what happened last week. Political alliances cannot be one way. They have to reflect a genuine political project or else they become pure treachery.

6-     The biggest lie though is that the elections were postponed for security reasons. We all know that the conflict in Syria is a protracted one and will last for years ahead and that the fight against terrorism is a never-ending one. Does this mean we should keep the same Parliament for 10 years? Is the Civil Society today a legitimate partner while it was demonized a while ago?

7-     The fact that the Civil Society protests did not mobilize a lot of people comes as no surprise. In fact, when the majority of the Lebanese do not endorse human rights values, they cannot be relied on in fights such as this one.

8-     What is surprising though is that some political figures “suddenly remembered” the Civil Society while they did not refrain before from systematically undermining the work of these organizations. The memory of Minister Jreissaty seems to be too flawed. Can the same Civil society be “suspicious” in some cases and called upon in other cases?

9-     Referring to the International Human rights instruments by some politicians is another absurd approach since these same figures intended to delegitimize the human rights legal framework for years while today they refer to it to support their discourse?

10-  The end result is that the decision to extend the Parliament’s mandate is consistent with the scale of values of most of the Lebanese who never endorsed the values of Human dignity, freedom and equality. This is understandably reflected in the practices of a morally corrupt political establishment. So stop whining and revisit the scale of values before blaming others.

Islamic State and Related Attacks in Lebanon Demand Comprehensive Response

By: Elie Abouaoun
Islamic State and Related Attacks in Lebanon Demand Comprehensive
Response

Tuesday, November 4, 2014

Attacks by militants in Lebanon backed by an Al-Qaida affiliate and the
Islamic State have highlighted again the vulnerability of the country's
armed forces to terrorist threats and the political establishment's failure to
reach agreement on a military strategy to confront terrorism. The solution
will require much more than addressing the shortcomings of the military.
Political leaders must address the underlying factors that contribute to the
ability of extremists to make inroads and recruit on Lebanese soil.

Outbreaks of fighting in Lebanon have heightened fears that the war in Syria is spilling over the border, threatening their fragile stability.

The August assault on several military and police posts in the Lebanese border town of Arsal raised fears of a replica of the Islamic State’s capture of Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul.

While the militant groups, led by al-Qaida affiliate Nusra Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, ultimately backed off in Lebanon – that time -- it was clearly a tactical withdrawal. Insurgents linked to or inspired by the extremist groups have staged multiple assaults since then.

Neither Nusra Front nor the Islamic State can spare fighters to mount a full invasion of Lebanon, as some overly dramatic political observers have claimed. But the acute Sunni-Shia polarization in the broader region, the chaotic management of the Syrian refugees influx, and the continual flow of money to militant groups, compounded by financial and logistical help from Lebanese factions and the country’s own deep divisions, have contributed to the
radicalization of youths and opportunities for recruitment of fighters.

The new international coalition to counter the Islamic State may be able to degrade the group’s capabilities eventually, but the offensive is unlikely to destroy the militant organization entirely, so the threat will remain. and Lebanon must shore up its own defenses.

The discord within Lebanon’s government, which emerges regularly on other dangerous issues as well, essentially has paralyzed political decision-making and deprived the Lebanese Army of the necessary political umbrella to launch a larger military operation against the militant attacks. The tensions are exacerbated by divisions over the role of Hezbollah in supporting the forces of President Bashar al-Assad in neighboring Syria.

The Lebanese armed forces, as a result, suffer from a lack of proper training, equipment and command-and-control functions and from impunity for inept or corrupt high-ranking officers.

Now that Lebanon is in an open confrontation with terrorist groups, all efforts are converging to buy equipment and train army personnel.

A comprehensive strategy

But just as important is a comprehensive strategy to address emerging terrorist threats that includes a military aspect – strengthening the armed forces, eliminating politicization of the military and instituting accountability measures – but also contains political and social dimensions. The Lebanese government must find a way to cope reasonably with the ticking time bomb of the Syrian refugee crisis. At the same time, officials must shore up the domestic
education system, boost the economy and resume a long-stalled national dialogue to reach a political settlement among the country’s feuding factions.

The clash in refugee policies and practices by the United Nations and the Lebanese government has heightened the susceptibility of Syrian refugees to recruitment by militant groups, putting the Lebanese armed forces in the unsavory position of either conducting military operations in refugee camps and settlements that could result in civilian casualties, or just standing by while terrorist groups fill their ranks.

The registration of Syrian refugees has been flawed since its very beginning, so the available numbers today are actually higher than the reality, in part because a number of Syrians live in Lebanon because of economic hardship at home, not necessarily because they risk violence or harm . Authorities should urgently undertake a review of the status of refugees in Lebanon based on transparent criteria and in compliance with international standards, and then provide those legitimately fleeing violence with the international protection to which
they are entitled and adopt a long-delayed foreign-labor policy to handle the remainder.

The government also could design innovative solutions to provide education for the estimated 250,000 young Syrian refugees who aren’t getting an education and devise employment programs for the adults. Ad-hoc settlements of refugees also need to be better organized to improve the efficiency and delivery of the services they need.

For its own citizens, Lebanon’s government must reform the education system, address the significant socio-economic gaps and, most importantly, re-launch a genuine national dialogue process to move the country beyond its debilitating divisions. Lebanon’s economic growth has plunged since the outbreak of conflict next door in Syria, from 8 percent in 2010 to less than 1 percent in 2013, according to the World Bank. And while private education has
ballooned, the government has fallen behind not only in the schools and universities it runs but also in adequately regulating and holding accountable the private sector. Today’s reality of the education sector in Lebanon, coupled with the difficulty finding employment, especially for youth, creates the ideal conditions for radical groups to ramp up their own enrollment
efforts.
Failing to adopt a comprehensive strategy to counter extremist violence and influence only adds to the multiple vulnerabilities of Lebanon, turning a small country into an attractive theater of operations for an array of nefarious players.

Elie Abouaoun is director of Middle East programs at USIP and a lecturer at Saint Joseph University in Beirut.

Reflection On Lebanon political system published in An-Nahar

ايلي ابو عون

1 آب 2014

كثرت في الآونة الاخيرة – في اطار المشاحنات الرئاسية اللبنانية – الطروحات والطروحات المضادة عن موضوعات مهمة للغاية يبتذلها بعض الافواه والاقلام بأبشع ما يمكن ان يتصوره اي شخص يتمتع بالحد الادنى من الحس النقدي.
اول هذه الموضوعات المتداولة هو ما يعرف لبنانياً بـ"المثالثة" اي تقسيم السلطة في لبنان بين السنة والشيعة والمسيحيين خلافا للنموذج السابق والمعروف بـ"المناصفة" بين المسيحيين والمسلمين (سنة وشيعة ودروز وعلويين).
وهنا يتعمد المزايدون اغفال ابسط القواعد المنطقية في مقاربة طبيعة النظام السياسي اللبناني. اذ ان الهدف من انشاء نظام سياسي قائم على الانتماء المذهبي – بحسناته وسيئاته – هو الاخذ بالمعطى التاريخي بأن يتقاطع الانتماء السياسي مع المذهبي لدى شريحة كبرى من اللبنانيين مما يتطلب نظاما سياسيا يبنى على هذا المعطى. لذا، وبصرف النظر اذا كان التقاسم مناصفة اومثالثة، لا يرتقي نظام من هذا النوع الى الهدف الذي انشئ من اجله، الا اذا تمتع من يمثل اي مكون من المجتمع اللبناني في تركيبة السلطة بمشروعية نابعة من المكون نفسه وليس من اي مكون آخر. اذا نظرنا بتمعن في مدى توافر هذا الشرط منذ عام 1990 نجد ان النظم الانتخابية المعتمدة منذ انتهاء الحرب كرست مبدأ التمثيل المجتزأ خاصة عند المسيحيين (ولكن ليس عندهم فقط). ففي كل الدورات الانتخابية لم تتعدَ نسبة النواب المسيحيين المنتخبين من المكونات المسيحية الثلث بأفضل الاحوال، علماً انها كانت اقل من الربع في اكثر المرات. ووجدت المشكلة نفسها في اغلب الحكومات، اذ ان عدد الحكومات التي تعكس التمثيل السياسي الصحيح كانت غائبة تماماً بين 1990 و2005. اذاً المناصفة الذي يتغنى بها البعض في ايامنا هذه ليست إلّا وهماً وخيالاً. في هذا الاطار يطل البعض بحجة واقعية، ولكن غير دقيقة بأن اتفاق الطائف كرس المناصفة اقله بالنص، ولكن الممارسة خالفت النص. ينسى هذا البعض ان دستور الطائف ينص على امور عدة منها الغاء "الطائفية السياسية" وانتخابات على اساس دوائر معدلة، مما يطيح بمبدأ التمثيل الفعلي وينقض بشكل كبير متطلبات المناصفة.
لذا ان الامر الاساس والسابق لنقاش المناصفة او المثالثة هو اما اعتماد نظام سياسي غير مبني على الانتماء المذهبي (والذي لا يصلح للواقع اللبناني الحالي برأيي) او ان تقبل كل المكونات بمبدأ التمثيل الصحيح بما فيه ان يتخلى كل من تيار المستقبل "وحزب الله" وحركة "امل" والحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي عن الاتيان بوزراء ونواب مسيحيين تابعين لهم (منتخبين من قبل قواعدهم الشعبية). كل كلام عن مناصفة او مثالثة قبل الاقرار بمبدأ حصرية التمثيل يبقى ذراً للرماد في عيون اللبنانيين.
من جهة اخرى، شهد السجال الانتخابي الرئاسي ايضاً طرح "مواصفات" الرئيس المنتظر. فنشط خيال السياسيين وبعض الاعلام في "حلب" مفردات اللغة العربية ليتحفونا بمصطلحات مثل "الرئيس القوي" او "التوافقي" او "الوفاقي" او "الوسطي" وغيرها من المفردات الرنانة. ولم يفكر هؤلاء في ان هذه المواصفات تبقى فارغة المضمون ما لم يتحدد الدور السياسي الذي "يجب" و"يمكن" ان يمارسه الرئيس في ضوء الواقع اللبناني والصلاحيات المتاحة له دستوريا. وبناء عليه، ان الاطار الافضل للنقاش هو اذا كانت وظيفة رئيس الجمهورية ان "يحكم"، "يدير" او ان يكون "حكما". الادوار الثلاثة مختلفة تماما والاتفاق على الدور يملي الآلية التي يجب اعتمادها، كما و"بروفايل" الرئيس.
فاذا كان المطلوب من الرئيس ان يحكم يجب انتخابه بالاكثرية المطلقة، ويمكن ان يأتي الرئيس في هذه الحالة من كنف الاكثرية النيابية وان يتمتع بصفات قيادية بامتياز. ولكن هذا الخيار يتطلب تعديلا دستوريا يعيد النظر في الصلاحيات الرئاسية بما يتيح للرئيس ان يحكم. اما دور "المدير" – اسوأ الخيارات على الاطلاق – فهو اقرب ما يكون عليه هو شخص غير قيادي تكنوقراطي على الارجح ولا يتمتع بالضرورة بحيثية سياسية. اما الدور التحكيمي فيتطلب رئيساً مقبولاً من الجميع دون ان يعني هذا ان يكون مجردا من الحيثية السياسية. فالحكم يجب ان لا يكون "موظفا" عند احد (والا انتفت صفته التحكيمية) بل على العكس يجب ان يكون لديه القدرة على التأثير الايجابي في مختلف الاطراف دون ان يفقده هذا استقلاليته وهامش المناورة. لا بد من الاعتراف بأن حاضر لبنان ومستقبله القريب يتطلبان دورا تحكيميا للرئيس اكثر من اي شيء آخر. هذا الدور مختلف جذريا عن الوسطية بالمفهوم اللبناني، والتي اضحت مجرد "ضربة على الحافر وضربة على المسمار"... هل يصوب النقاش في اتجاه عقلاني يسمح بتحديد دور الرئيس المقبل ومواصفاته؟

ايلي ابو عون

Comment on Ersal - Lebanon incidents

English Follows Arabic

سألني البعض لماذا كتبت مقالا بعد اجتياح الموصل عن أهمية البعد السياسي للحل في العراق بينما عبرت عن أن الحل العسكري هو الأساس لما يحدث في شرق لبنان. بالنسبة لي الفرق واضح: أساس المشكلة في العراق هي مشكلة سياسية تتمثل بأقصاء مكونات أساسية عن اليات المشاركة في القرار أدت الى تفاهم ظرفي بين العشائرالسنية و المتضررين من سياسات المالكي و تنظيمات كداعش و اخواتها. و لولا هذا التفاهم الظرفي لما تمكنت داعش من التقدم ميدانيا. البرهان على ذلك أنه عندما قررت الصحوات العراقية محاربة الحركات التكفيرية في عامي 2007 و 2008 نجحت بنسبة كبيرة فيما اخفق اكبر جيش في العالم في تحقيق نفس النتيجة. أما في لبنان فرغم اختلال التوازن نوعا ما في نسبة المشاركة في القرار السياسي الا أن المتضرر الأكبر على هذا المستوى هو المكون المسيحي و ليس السني. كما أن الأحداث الأخيرة برهنت أن التحرك التكفيري في عرسال لم يلق أي دعم فعلي من أي طرف سياسي أو شعبي لا بل أن الشكاوى من أهل عرسال نفسهم مؤشر على أنه لا يوجد بيئة حاضنة فعلية لهذا التحرك. لذا طبيعة المعركة الحالية في لبنان هي الى حد كبير طبيعة عسكرية – أمنية و ليس سياسية.  و بالتالي أي محاولة لإيجاد تسوية سياسية لهذه الحالة هو من أخطر ما يمكن أن يحصل.

I got some questions about the difference in the approaches I am writing about to deal with both the Iraqi and Lebanese situation. In the aftermath of the Mosul invasion, I called, in an article, for a political solution whereas in Lebanon I am calling for a military one. For me, the difference is clear: The core issue in Iraq is political i.e. the political marginalization of essential constituents which led to a temporary arrangement between ISIS, Sunni tribes and those who consider themselves victims of Maliki political behavior. Without this temporary arrangement, ISIS would not have been able to gain any territory in Iraq. The evidence to this is that when the Awakening Councils in Iraq decided to fight the radical terrorist groups in 2007 and 2008, they succeeded to a large extent while the most powerful army was unable to claim the same gain. In Lebanon the situation is different in the sense that despite the current imbalance in the power sharing system, the Christian constituent is the one mostly affected by this imbalance and not the Sunni one. Moreover, the recent events showed that there was no real support to the IS campaign from any political party. The complains from Arsal inhabitants themselves is a clear indicator that they don’t endorse what is happening. Therefore, the nature of the fights in Lebanon is pretty much military/security oriented and any attempt to find a political accommodation with these groups is the biggest danger at this stage.  

Iraq Crisis: Will Politics Deliver More After Military Response This Time?

Tuesday, June 17, 2014

By: 

Elie Abouaoun

Just six months ago, I was having a traditional Iraqi dinner with a friend in a building overlooking the Tigris River. But this was no ordinary Iraqi, and our surroundings were hardly luxurious. My friend is a senior Iraqi intelligence officer and a close aide to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the setting was his bunker-like office in a heavily guarded military compound in Baghdad. Security threats left us no choice.

People leaving areas controlled by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria wait to clear the Khazer checkpoint between Mosul and Erbil in Iraq, June 14, 2014. Photo Credit: The New York Times/ Bryan Denton

Our conversation quickly turned to the escalating security and political turmoil in Iraq. “The conflict in Syria is our major concern,” he told me. “The groups are moving freely between Syria and Iraq and are building up forces in some areas in Iraq where we expect more troubles. We think of this as an existential threat, and all our energy is focused now on curbing the expansion of these movements.”

Unfortunately, “all” the energy turned out to be mainly focused on military efforts rather than the desperately needed political accommodation that might have headed off the downward spiral we see in Iraq today. But it’s not too late – in fact, it’s even more urgent -- to think about the political approach needed now to ensure that any potential military counter-offensive will be sustainable this time.

Despite those huge military and security efforts, the question is why the militant group Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) still was able to conquer a geographical space as large as North Carolina? It is an achievement that no non-state player in the region had been able to claim before.

Although there certainly are various factors at play, including regional dynamics such as the competition between primarily Shia Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia, groups like ISIL cannot operate so freely in an environment of public hostility toward them. So, does the fact that they’ve swept easily across northern Iraq mean that the Sunnis of Al-Anbar, Nineveh, Salah El-Dine, Diyala and other provinces are all supporters of ISIL? Are they all terrorists? Certainly not.

The most reasonable analysis of why ISIL was able to move without significant resistance by local citizens in the Sunni provinces is that the political process in Iraq failed. The Sunnis who helped suppress a previous extremist-led insurgency in 2007 felt disenfranchised from the government that Maliki controlled. He invested heavily in military and other security measures in response to political grievances that turned into months of public demonstrations. He put far less energy into building trust with Sunnis, Kurds and other components of today’s Iraq.

Call it shortsighted strategy or the curse of the powerful or the trend of new-wave dictatorship or whatever -- the result is the same: a huge percentage of Iraqis felt targeted, marginalized, ostracized and dismissed. The Iraqis waited for elections, and all they got was a renewal of the same political order that they saw as responsible for disaster for the last seven years. In their frustration and desperation, would they resist any attempt to force change, regardless of what form it took? Not likely.

The International community is mobilizing now to address the ISIL surge in Iraq. While some military actions might be considered, the most pressing need is for a political strategy.

There is no way a military response will pacify Iraq and the region. It might halt the progress of ISIL for a while. But a sustainable peace in Iraq cannot be achieved without a credible political settlement.

If there is a niche where the U.S., the EU and other Western countries could be particularly effective, it is in pressing for and supporting the design and implementation of a full-fledged, inclusive national dialogue in Iraq, as should have been done in April 2003.  Such a dialogue would aim to address the legitimate concerns of various constituencies in Iraq, including revisiting the current political arrangements to ensure all are represented fairly.

To further strengthen the outcomes of such a dialogue would eventually require a de-escalation at the regional level as well, namely between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is a process the U.S. already started pushing for and is worth continuing.

My friend in Baghdad is busy today with the military response launched by the government of Iraq. Will he and others in Iraq’s ruling elite acknowledge that a political settlement will be imperative to sustain any military gain that he and his fellow generals achieve in the coming days? Will the U.S. and the West deliver enough resources and pressure to make sure the 2014 counter-insurgency does not fade away as did the one in 2007?

Let no one try to fool Iraqis and public opinion in the West by promoting an exclusively military response. There’s also an urgent need to talk politics.

Elie Abouaoun is USIP’s director of Middle East programs, based in Beirut.

Lebanese Presidential Elections

Q&A: Lebanese Presidential Elections (published by USIP)

Published: 

May 29, 2014

By: 

Elie Abouaoun

Lebanon’s parliament failed to elect a successor within the constitutional timeframe before President Michel Suleiman’s term expired on May 25. Elie Abouaoun, the director of Middle East programs for the U.S. Institute of Peace, explains the dynamics feeding the divisions, the ramifications of the vacancy and possible solutions.

Lebanon’s internal political and sectarian divisions have deepened precipitously since the outbreak of civil war in neighboring Syria, as refugees from that fighting fled across the border and Lebanese factions took sides in the neighboring conflict. The Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah intervened to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Sunni groups sided with the rebels in Syria.Camp in Lebanon close to the Syrian border. Photo: Elgaard

A group of international officials on May 26 called for an end to the power vacuum by electing a new President and for Lebanon’s leaders to ensure the government of Prime Minister Tammam Salam has the authority to deal with economic, security and humanitarian issues in the meantime.

Has this happened before?

This constitutional milestone is known to polarize political leaders in and around Lebanon and often even international players. So this is not the first time the Lebanese presidential election has created a deadlock. In 12 similar presidential-succession crises since Lebanon became an independent country in 1943, electing a new president proved to be difficult and led to half-baked imposed solutions.

How does a vacancy in the presidency affect the fragile stability in Lebanon?

Because this has happened before and because most regional and international leaders wouldn’t benefit from major upheaval in Lebanon, this latest occurrence isn’t likely to cause a deterioration that would lead to civil war. Even for the most militarized party in Lebanon, Hezbollah, an internal conflict in Lebanon would only divert the group’s resources from the main battle it is leading in support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in neighboring Syria and from its overall mandate of fighting Israel. The only game changer for Hezbollah would be if it identifies an internal threat to its existence or operations. Other parties in Lebanon are far from posing such a threat at this stage.

However, the partial paralysis at the legislative and executive levels now could trigger other crises as the existing economic, social and humanitarian (Syrian refugees) challenges worsen. 

Why is electing a President so complicated in a nation known to have adopted rather democratic practices compared to the largely authoritarian neighboring countries?

The Presidential election crisis is a symptom of a larger and deep-rooted problem: the formal Lebanese political system is not properly structured for a country of 18 different religious groups and intense identity-based politics. Despite constitutional changes introduced in 1926, 1943 and 1989, the system is largely based on majority rule. But in practice, different parties with different interpretations of legislation can block measures in efforts to strengthen their grip on the power structures. That results in political deadlocks that usually are resolved only through settlements brokered by regional or international powers.  

So, the most urgent need for Lebanon now is structural reforms to the political system. Political and civil society leaders should admit that a majority cannot govern Lebanon today with its demographic, social and political diversity.  Instead, the constitution should reflect the customary practice used since 1943 and formalize a system based on consensus that would also spell out interim arrangements. Crises might still occur, but their length and intensity might be eased.  While the easiest solution would be another quick fix, that would only have a palliative effect until the next crisis erupts.

How do you envisage a new President will be elected?

It is hard to predict. The fate of the Presidency depends on the outcome of the potential talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If these discussions do not result in political arrangements (assuming Lebanon is even on the agenda, which is still uncertain), it is likely that another regional mediation will be initiated for Lebanon. Regional intervention in the Lebanese parliament’s selection of a president has always been and will still be a determining factor if the whole Lebanese political system is not revisited.

Are there any top candidates for President and what kind of influence do they have?

None of the top four Christian political figures who have significant constituencies seem likely to win, at least in part because none of them is accepted by both sides on Lebanon’s pro-Iran and pro-Saudi divide. The most likely scenario is that prospective mediators will look for a “compromise” (second-tier) candidate agreed by both Saudis and Iranians. Unfortunately, this means that the next president will have little margin to exercise real authority.

Elie Abouaoun is USIP’s director of Middle East Programs.

Tunisia and Libya’s Political Transitions: Impressions from the Field

Tunisia and Libya’s Political Transitions: Impressions from the Field (published by USIP)

Thursday, May 15, 2014

By: 

Elie Abouaoun

Tunisia and Libya recently took diverging tracks in their political transitions. A USIP field mission to both countries to meet with political and civil society leaders reveals potential lessons from Tunisia’s advances and possible opportunities that still exist for Libya to salvage its transition.

Photo Credit: Flickr/European Parliament/Ezequiel Scagnetti

Tunisia is, for now, the most successful example of a peaceful and decisive political transition. The deal struck by the country’s main political parties on a roadmap eased an acute political crisis and undeniably constitutes a major breakthrough.

Reaching agreement was not easy, but the discussions that led to it were supported by the weighty and direct involvement of the Tunisian Bar Association, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and the Tunisian Union for Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts. This so-called “National Dialogue Quartet” put enormous pressure on political parties to end a months-long stalemate. By positioning itself as a mediator, the quartet used varying techniques of persuasion and coercion to make sure all political parties came back to the table.

This unprecedented example in the Middle East and North Africa materialized mainly because of the strong credibility these four organizations built over time since the era of Habib Bourguiba, who led Tunisia to independence in 1956 and served as its president for 30 years until 1987. Each of the four groups is seen as a mobilizing force within its respective constituency; that allowed them to alternately position themselves as mediators or as enforcers who could threaten to name-and-shame the spoilers in case of a failure to reach a political settlement.

Certainly, the 2013 military ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt and the subsequent violence in the largest Arab country contributed to the urgency of reaching a political agreement in Tunisia. Beyond the promising prospects for Tunisia, this experience should be documented to inspire other countries in political transition. The main aspects to study would be how the quartet formed, the internal mechanisms used by the four members to navigate the troubled waters of Tunisia’s transition, and the role of the various levels of dialogue and consensus-building within the Constituent Assembly.

Libya is on a very different track, one marred by increased violence and political stagnation. But several indicators suggest the country is at a crossroad and still has realistic chances to see a political settlement emerge. Direct and behind-the-scenes negotiations are still taking place despite flares of violence. 

Not only was the National Dialogue Preparatory Commission, established by ousted Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, not dissolved, but it recently stepped up its activities. There are other smaller-scale dialogue initiatives underway as well, and the international community is vigorously trying to mediate to bring the scattered efforts under one umbrella. The major political players are serious about finding an acceptable deal because, as they have acknowledged, they know none of them could win outright.

The absence of credible civic groups who could play the role of “conflict inhibitors” such as in Tunisia is glaring in Libya. But alternative mediation mechanisms might still be found because at least the public seems to be interested in seeing their political leaders reach a settlement. While most Libyans rank security first on their list of priorities, most acknowledge that restoring security is not achievable without the right political framework.

The priority now should be to encourage the country’s embryonic, frustrated and disillusioned civil society to re-engage with the political process. Libya is in a critical phase of its political transition, yet a collapse into the torments of civil war is not yet a certainty. A lot can still be done to push for progress towards a less violent transition.

Elie Abouaoun is USIP’s director of Middle East Programs, based in Beirut.

Decadence of Lebanese Ministry of Interior

This copy of the official gazette shows that the ministry of interior (MoI) in Lebanon established an not for profit entity, founded by three governmental institutions, to rehabilitate prisons, provide counselling to prisoners and work to amend laws related to prisons. So practically we have now a private association established by three governmental institutions whose mission is to do the work that the government should do. Moreover, the representative of this association towards the government is MoI itself. So MoI represents itself towards MoI. This initiative comes at a time when the Government of Lebanon is committed to the process of transferring the prisons’ administration from MoI to the ministry of justice in the framework of a cooperation with international institutions. Few thoughts and questions:

1- What is the real objective behind this strange initiative where a private association established by government bodies does the work that should be done by the government? 

2- The decree is signed by several officials. Didn’t they hear about “conflict of interest”? This association is the best example of conflict interest and worth being used as a case study in universities. 

3- Who can hold this association accountable about its work and finances? 

4- MoI was supposed to transfer prisons administration to the ministry of justice but now they are coming back by the window after they left through the door. 

Disregarding the legality (or not) of this decree, it contradicts the basic principle of good governance; moreover the basic elements of logic. I was always in support of privatizing as many State services as possible including prisons administration – while expecting it never happens. However, this decree shows we are going on a completely different track of governmental decadence.

نسخة من الجريدة الرسمية تبين أن وزارة الداخلية أنشأت جمعية لا تبغي الربح مهمتها الرئيسية تأهيل السجون و تأمين الارشاد في السجون و تعديل القوانين ذات الصلة. مؤسسي هذه الجمعية هم 3 جهات حكومية فقط لا غير. عمليا لدينا الان جمعية خاصة اسستها 3 جهات حكومية و ممثلة الجمعية لدى الحكومة هي...وزارة الداخلية نفسها. فالوزارة تمثل نفسها لدى الوزارة. عمل هذه الجمعية هو خلاصة واجبات الدولة في هذا المجال و تأتي هذه الخطوة في وقت التزمت الدولة اللبنانية نقل صلاحية إدارة السجون من وزارة الداخلية الى وزارة العدل ضمن برنامج تعاون مع جهات دولية. هذه المبادرة تطرح أسئلة عديدة:

1- ما هو الهدف الحقيقي من هذه المبادرة الغريبة التي تؤدي الى أن تقوم جمعية خاصة اسستها جهات حكومية بما يجب أن تقوم به الدولة؟
2- ألم يسمع الوزراء و الرؤساء الذين وقعوا على هذا المرسوم (و لا سيما معالي وزير الداخلية) بمبدأ "تضارب المصالح"؟ هذه الجمعية من أفضل الحالات المعبرة عن فكرة تضارب المصالح و يجب أن تدرس في الجامعات 
3- من يقوم بمساءلة هذه الجمعية عن عملها و ماليتها؟ 
4- تخرج وزارة الداخلية من الباب لتعود من النافذة (في موضوع السجون) فماذا عن برنامج نقل صلاحية إدارة السجون الى وزارة العدل؟ 

بغض النظر عن قانونية (او عدمه) هذا الاجراء فهو يخالف ابسط مبادئ الحوكمة الصالحة لا بل أبعد من ذلك ابسط أسس المنطق. أنا كنت دائما من دعاة خصخصة أكبر عدد من الخدمات الحكومية بما فيها إدارة السجون و لكنني كنت أعلم أن هذا لن يحصل. لكن هذا المرسوم يؤدي بنا الى حالة انحطاط لا توصف. و السلام.

Comments on Syria (french)

Déchirures meurtrières en Syrie

Dans la foulée des révoltes arabes en 2011, les
jeunes Syriens ont pu initier un mouvement
de protestation en vue d’instaurer un régime
démocratique en remplacement d’une dictature
qui n’a que trop duré. Ce mouvement pacifique
s’est transformé en une guerre civile, une des
guerres des plus meurtrières de l’histoire moderne.
Aujourd’hui, tout le monde, ou presque, peine à
qualifier ce conflit hybride : est-ce un conflit syrosyrien
ou simplement un conflit régional dont les
acteurs sont locaux ?
La définition du conflit importe peu au regard des
milliers de victimes et des centaines de milliers de
déplacés et réfugiés. Bien plus, les parties en conflit
semblent avoir perdu de vue toute perspective de
solution. A les voir, on a l’impression qu’ils se battent
pour se battre, sans horizon quelconque. Cette
situation fait aussi le jeux des grandes nations : les
Russes et affiliés considèrent chaque jour qui passe
avec Bachar El-Assad à la tête du régime comme
un gain alors que l’Occident, lui, considère que les
Iraniens et le Hezbollah investissent beaucoup en
Syrie. A tel point qu’ils finiront bien par se rendre à
la table de négociation, époustouflés.
Les Israéliens, eux, jubilent du fait que le Hezbolllah
a envoyé des milliers de combattants en Syrie, ce
qui affaiblit sa capacité militaire initialement bâtie
pour les combattre. Si leurs tentatives d’impliquer
le parti de Dieu dans une guerre civile au Liban n’ont
pas abouti, le résultat de son implication en Syrie
n’est pas moins importante pour eux. Les Russes
et les Américains ne sont pas vexés de voir tant de
djihadistes converger en Syrie pour « accomplir leur
devoir ». Finalement, ils se retrouvent tous dans un
même bocal et deviennent plus faciles à surveiller
et, éventuellement, à cerner.

Jurisprudence

A l’ombre de l’incapacité et/ou la non-volonté de la
Communauté Internationale de mettre fin à ce conflit,
les réalités du terrain montrent aussi qu’une victoire
militaire totale, tant pour le régime que pour ses
opposants, relève de l’impossible. Au final, tout le monde
devra aller à une solution négociée.
Mais la question qui se pose actuellement est la suivante :
quelle est la solution qui réussira à pacifier une Syrie
déchirée en mille morceaux ?
D’une part, la montée de l’Islam politique, en Syrie
et dans la région en général, ravive la fracture entre
laïcs et islamistes. D’autre part, le conflit, à caractère
sectaire, dans une Syrie pluraliste est un défi en soi :
quel est l’avenir des relations communautaires entre
Alaouites, Sunnites, Chrétiens, Kurdes et Druzes ? Est-ce
que les lignes de démarcations ethno-confessionnelles,
dessinées par un conflit aussi fort, disparaîtront par un
simple accord politique parrainé par la Communauté
Internationale ? L’exemple d’une « paix virtuelle » dans
un Liban meurtri, à l’issue de quinze ans de guerre civile
servira-t-il à dissiper cette illusion simpliste qu’un cessezle-
feu puisse instaurer une paix durable ? Quid des
centaines de milliers de déplacés et des fractures (pro et
anti-régime) au sein d’une même communauté résultant
d’une violence sans précédent ?
Apres trente mois de conflit, la Syrie a besoin d’une
solution à plusieurs niveaux et volets. Si un accord
politique pour mettre fin aux confrontations militaires
est inéluctable, il reste que l’instauration d’une paix
durable ne saura réussir sans une transition politique
basée sur le principe de « vérité et de réconciliation ». Et,
surtout, sans un processus politique qui devra s’étendre
au niveau social. A défaut, ce ne sera qu’une simple
cessation des hostilités, prélude à une confrontation
plus grave dans quelque temps. A bon entendeur…

par Elie Abouaoun, NDH-Liban
Responsable de Programmes à l’Institut de Paix des États Unis

Comments on STL start-up sessions

الترجمة بالعربية تلي النص الإنجليزي

This week, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) will hold its first trial sessions. This is surely a historical moment for Lebanon for one main reason: this is the first time a case of political violence in Lebanon is taken as far as being probed by an International Independent Investigation Committee (IIIC) and brought before a “Special International Tribunal:

1-     Despite the excitement by rights activists about this attempt to end impunity in Lebanon, the main challenge remains for the STL to reverse the perception of many Lebanese that arouse due to the controversial performance of the IIIC. Neither the scope of the crimes probed by the IIIC nor the complexity of the situation in Lebanon are sufficient justification for many of the shortcomings seen between 2005 and 2009. It is crucial for the credibility of international justice to have a flawless judicial process that would shift the perception, in Lebanon and the region, that international justice is nothing but a political tool manipulated by the “big 5”.

2-     Stunning is the poor and disrespectful performance of the STL spokesman Mr. Martin Youssef on New TV on Sunday. When confronted with a question about the many standpoints in Lebanon about STL, all what he had to say that “Part of the Lebanese population don’t want to see the crimes judged by independent judges…” and carried on with a couple of other critiques against “part of the Lebanese population”.  Not only Mr. Youssef represents STL, he should himself be an expert in communication. Dealing with negative perceptions of some people in Lebanon does not – and should not – lead to such generalizations and disrespectful comments about the Lebanese. As the spokesman of the STL and communication expert, he should know this quite well.  Mr. Youssef endorsed the well-known black or white approach; an approach that is used mainly by ideological regimes (if you are not with me then you are against me). He categorized people into blind believers in or opponents to STL. He could not – or does not want to – imagine that there are people in Lebanon who would are dying to see the concept of international justice succeed but at the same time are skeptical about the STL success exactly because of the poor performance of some IIIC and STL personnel  including Mr. Youssef himself.

تعقد هذا الأسبوع أولى جلسات المحكمة الخاصة بلبنان. لا شك بأن هذه اللحظة تاريخية اقله لأنها المرة الأولى في تاريخ لبنان التي يتم إحالة جريمة سياسية الى لجنة تحقيق دولية ومن ثم الى محكمة خاصة دولية:

1-     رغم الحماسة الشديدة عند كثير من الناشطين الحقوقيين حول هذه المحاولة للحد من الإفلات من العقاب في لبنان، لا بد لهذه المحكمة أن تنجح في تغيير الانطباع السائد عند عدد من اللبنانيين نتيجة الأداء الجدلي للجنة التحقيق الدولية. ولا يعقل أن تتم تبرير بعض هفوات هذه اللجنة بين عامي 2005 و2009 باي شكل رغم حجم الجرائم المحالة الى اللجنة ورغم تعقيدات الوضع اللبناني. من الضروري جدا، لأجل مصداقية نظام العدالة الدولية، أن تجرى المحاكمات بشكل يؤدي الى تغيير الانطباع السائد في لبنان والمنطقة بأن نظام العدالة الدولية ليس الا أداة سياسية يستخدم غب الطلب من الدول الكبرى.

اقل ما يقال بالمقابلة المتلفزة مع الناطق الرسمي باسم المحكمة السيد مارتن يوسف على شاشة التلفزيون الجديد يوم البارحة. عندما سؤل السيد يوسف عن الاختلاف في وجهات النظر في لبنان حول عمل المحكمة لم يكن لديه سوى اتهام "جزئ من الشعب اللبناني بأنه لا يريد رؤية قضاة مستقلين النظر في جرائم" وأكمل باتهامات أخرى "لجزء من الشعب اللبناني...". اليس السيد يوسف الناطق الرسمي باسم المحكمة فحسب بل يفترض به أن يكون أيضا خبيرا في مجال التواصل وبهتين الصفتين لا بد له أن يعرف جيدا ان معالجة الانطباعات السلبية لا يعالج بالتعميم وسيل الاتهامات ولا باعتماد المقاربة المفضلة للأنظمة الأيديولوجية بأن من ليس معي هو بالضرورة ضدي. لقد صنف السيد يوسف الشعب اما بخانة الولاء الأعمى للمحكمة اما العداء لهاو لم يستطع التفكير بأن هناك أناس في لبنان مهتمون جدا بنجاح تجربة العدالة الدولية ولكنهم متخوفون من انعكاس سوء أداء بعض موظفي لجنة التحقيق والمحكمة الدولية – بمن فيهم السيد يوسف نفسه – على حظوظ نجاح المحكمة الدولية بالحد من الإفلات من العقاب.