Syria’s refugee crisis: the unseen end of the tunnel

Published in the PHAP newsletter (Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection) 

Dr. Elie Abouaoun
Executive Director

Arab Human Rights Fund

February 2013

Syria has been in turmoil since early 2011. However, the escalation witnessed in the last weeks indicates a change in the nature of the military actions, with considerable and overt implications for civilians. Not only is the geographical area affected by the conflict larger now, but also more deadly weapons are in use and more intense fights are commonly reported. As always, the civilian population is paying the price: we have an estimated death toll of 60,000 persons, 1.2 million internally displaced, and around 600,000 refugees, mainly in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon but also in smaller numbers in other countries, such as Iraq and Egypt. 

The international community has intensified its efforts to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of the conflict-affected population inside Syria and in the neighboring countries where refugees have sought safe haven. Given the likely timeframe of the crisis, and the likelihood of refugees returning, is this enough?

Realizing the plight’s timeframe is key

As in other similar crises, the complexity of the situation becomes more apparent when trying to envisage durable solutions rather than responding to the current humanitarian needs. While the outcome of the ongoing conflict remains unclear, the Syrian refugee crisis is likely to persist for some time. The fact that the military operations in Syria are increasing will further complicate the situation, leading to more displacement, more destruction, and a larger scar in the Syrian social fabric.

Syria’s neighboring countries have received hundreds of thousands of refugees, which has further strained their limited resources. Most of these countries already suffer from significant economic, infrastructural, political, social, and governance-related problems. Most importantly, these countries experience challenges in managing the diversity already existing within them, such as religious and ethnic differences in the cases of Iraq and Turkey, religious differences in Lebanon, and the West/East bank divide in Jordan. Therefore the problem posed by the large numbers of Syrian refugees is not only of an economic nature, but has implications for the existing political and demographic balances in each country.

This reality does not justify the hostile statements encountered from time to time in the media. While concerns related to the absorption capacity of each nearby country are legitimate, they are no excuse for non-compliance with the International Protection Regime of Refugees. The governments of Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have a legal obligation to comply. A certain margin of maneuver exists for these governments when discussing durable solutions to this crisis with the international community. But in the meantime, Syrian refugees should be granted unconditional access to safe havens and provided the necessary protection during their displacement.

While host countries have to provide adequate services and protection, the international community holds the much larger responsibility to assist these countries in their efforts to identify durable solutions for the thousands of families that might not be able to go back to their areas of origin as soon as most people initially thought. Thus, the primary aim of international donors at this stage should not be to flood host countries with money for material assistance. Instead, they need to start seriously working on adequate durable solutions to alleviate the burden put on these countries.

Past experiences from Iraq and other operations are not encouraging. In many cases, the international community has failed in its responsibilities to facilitate the design and ensure timely implementation of durable solutions. Simply put, assuming that there will be a massive return of refugees to Syria in the near future is not a good bet. And very little, if anything, is apparently being done by donors, international agencies, and host countries to address this situation.

Why people will think twice before returning

The spontaneous answer of most Syrian refugees would be that the only viable solution for them is to return home; very few of them realize the bitter reality that this will not happen soon.

First and foremost, in order to take a decision to return, refugees need to feel that their security and safety will be ensured. And here, one should not mistake the general security situation with the “perception of individual safety” that each refugee has to feel in order to return. There are a number of factors that will make security one of the major challenges for years to come: the evolution of the military operations, which now involve most of the Syrian regions, the scale of the killings, the chaotic proliferation of weapons, and the extreme polarization in the country, which currently divides according to whether you are pro- or anti-Assad as well as whether you are for or against an Islamic regime for the post Assad era

On the other hand, the infrastructure in Syria was already obsolete before the conflict. With the large scale destruction, protracted conflict, and the guerilla war currently going on, it is clear that Syria’s infrastructure would require, in the best case scenario, several years to be rehabilitated. Even before 2011, the economic situation in Syria was quite bad. Given the scarcity of resources in the country, major economic improvements are not expected until relative stability is reached and structural reforms to an archaic state-run economic system are implemented. Such reforms need several years to start having an impact. The speed of economic development in Syria will have a major impact on the return of refugees.

A protracted crisis

All signs indicate that the Syrian refugee crisis will become protracted. If this becomes the case, returning to their areas of origin will become a less viable option for most of the displaced. This will mean that some of them will stay in their host countries while some returnees and the IDPs will find themselves in a situation of secondary displacement inside Syria. With time, there will be more and more reasons why people will feel reluctant to go back home. Such predictions have implications for the way the return process should be planned and financed.

At the donor level, considering the crisis as a short-term humanitarian emergency would be shortsighted. Syria will require a long-term investment from donors that should not focus primarily on the economic aspects but instead mainly on the political and social aspects.

Any return movement will be conditioned by the future political demographics of the country, including the formation of religious, sectarian, or ethnically homogenous sub-regions, whether they are virtual or physical. The way in which an eventual political process is put in place and the level to which it will be inclusive is also a determining factor, together with considerations related to security, infrastructure, and economic opportunities.

On another level, the return process will also be conditioned by the general political, economic, and security situation in the already vulnerable host countries, as well as their willingness and capacity to keep large numbers of refugees on their territories and the levels of funding provided by the international community.

Concluding note

The outstanding question today is whether the international community and the specialized refugee agencies will be able to draw lessons from previous displacement crises and design a proper strategy for this complex situation in a highly volatile environment. The starting point is to capture the timeframe of this crisis in a realistic manner. Will things be different this time?