عشرة أفكار عن موضوع التمديد / Ten thoughts about the extension of the Lebanese Parliament’s mandate (english and arabic)

عشرة أفكار عن موضوع التمديد

سألني البعض لماذا لم أعلق بعد على قانون تمديد مجلس النواب اللبناني. الجواب انني كنت استجمع قواي بعد طعنة جديدة ولعلها ليست الأخيرة للحياة الديمقراطية في لبنان. لقد سمعت وقرأت الكثير-شأني شأن الكثير من اللبنانيين -من التعليقات المناهضة للتمديد أو المبررة له. رأيي المتواضع يتلخص بما يلي:

1-    ان قرار التمديد جاء نتيجة قرار إقليمي مرده الى عدم رغبة القوى السنية الإقليمية تكريس تراجع متوقع لحلفائهم انتخابيا في ضوء التنامي السريع للحركة الإسلامية المتطرفة في المنطقة وتراجع الحيثية المسماة "معتدلة" كما والى عدم قدرة إيران وحلفائها اللبنانيين على إدارة معركة انتخابية في ظل انشغالهم في المعركة السورية. تلاقت المصلحة السنية الشيعية على التمديد ونحرت الديمقراطية على يد قوى سنية وشيعية بتواطؤ – عن قصد أو غير قصد – بعض القوى المسيحية من الطرفين (القوات اللبنانية وتيار المردة) فيما وقفت قوى المسيحية الأخرى (التيار الوطني الحر والكتائب) في موقف العاجز عن التأثير في مواقف حلفائهم.

2-    إذا قرار التمديد ليس له علاقة لا بأسباب أمنية ولا بالاشتباك الرئاسي. هذه كلها أسباب تم اختلاقها لتبرير القرار ليس الا.

3-    بغض النظر عن رأي البعض من موقف التيار الوطني الحر من الانتخابات الرئاسية، ان ربط التمديد بهذا الموقف ليس واقعيا ومناورة واضحة تهدف الى تحوير الانتباه عن الأسباب الحقيقية وراء قرار التمديد أي كلمة السر السعودية وتلاقي المصلحة – الموضوعي-مع حزب الله في هذا الموضوع

4-    لا بد من التذكير بأن التمديد الأول حصل عندما كان الرئيس سليمان لا يزال يمارس مهامه فكيف يكون اليوم عدم انتخاب رئيس هو ما حتم السير بالتمديد؟ لماذا لم تتم الانتخابات قبل سنة؟

5-    لا بد أن يستخلص التيار الوطني الحر وحزب الكتائب العبرة من واقعة سير حلفاءهم بالتمديد غير ابهين برأيهم المناهض. فالتحالفات السياسية لا يجب أن تكون باتجاه واحد بل أن تعكس تلاقي على أجندة سياسية واضحة. والا يصبح الموضوع خدعة ليس أكثر.

6-    اما الكذبة الأكبر فهي أن التمديد سببه الوضع الأمني والحرب في سوريا. كلنا يعلم أن هذه الحرب مرشحة أن تطول لسنوات وأن مكافحة الإرهاب عملية طويلة لا تنتهي. هل هذا يعني ان نبقي على نفس المجلس النيابي لعشرة سنوات مثلا؟

7-    أما فيما يخص الحراك المدني لم يكن مفاجئا ألا يستطيع تجنيد سوى حفنة من الناشطين. عندما تكون أغلبية الشعب اللبناني فاسدة وعنصرية وغير متبنيه لقيم حقوق الانسان فلا مجال للاتكال على الرأي العام في مواجهة ممارسات لا تعتبرها هذه الأغلبية خطأ في الأساس

8-    اما المفاجأة في هذا الموضوع فهو استذكار "المجتمع المدني" من قبل أطرافا ما برحت ابرز اقطابها في مهاجمته منهجيا. يبدو أن ذاكرة الوزير سليم جريصاتي خانته عندما دعا المجتمع المدني الى التحرك. هل أصبح اليوم المجتمع المدني شريكا جيدا والبارحة كان نفس المجتمع المدني شرا مطلقا؟ هل يكون عمل المجتمع المدني مشبوها في مواضيع ومرحبا به في مواضيع أخرى؟ هل أصبح الناشطون سلاحا غب الطلب نستعمله متى يحلو لنا و "نشيطنه" في مناسبات أخرى؟

9-     ان الارتكاز الى المواثيق الدولية من قبل بعض مناهضي التمديد هو أيضا مخزي في وقت لم تتوقف نفس هذه الوجوه السياسية عن نعت نفس المنظومة القانونية التي يبخرون اليوم بأبشع الأوصاف وبشكل منهجي.

10-                    تبقى المحصلة النهائية أن قرار التمديد ينسجم تماما مع منظومة قيم غالبية اللبنانيين المناهضة لقيم الكرامة الإنسانية والحرية والمساواة والتي تعكسها طبقة سياسية فاسدة أخلاقيا ليصح المثل القائل "كما أنتم يولى عليكم". فكفوا عن التباكي وعيدوا النظر بقيمكم قبل القاء اللوم على الأخرين. دود الخل منو وفيه.

10  thoughts about the extension of the Lebanese Parliament’s mandate

Some people asked me why I did not comment yet on the decision to extend the mandate of the current Lebanese parliament. The truth is that I was trying to recover from another hard blow to the democratic practices in Lebanon; apparently not the last one. As most of the Lebanese, I have been reading and watching many “theories” about this decision. Below are few thoughts:

1-     The decision to extend the mandate of the Lebanese Parliament came as a result of a decision by regional Sunni powers not to live up to the reality of the decline of their influence as a result of the rampant radicalization AND to the lack of capacity of Iran and its Lebanese allies to engage in such elections while they are busy fighting in Syria. The interests of regional powers converged this time at the expense of democracy in Lebanon and led to a decision that the Christian parties had to accept. This how we ended up having political foes (Lebanese Forces and Marada) endorse the extension while others (Free Patriotic Movement and the Kataeb) were powerless in front of their respective allies.

2-     The extension decision has nothing to do with the security problems in Lebanon nor with the incapacity of the Parliament to elect a new President.

3-     Irrespective of the opinion about the Free Patriotic Movement’s stand on Presidential elections, the reality is that the extension has nothing to do with this stand. Linking the two is not realistic. Furthermore, it is a political maneuver to divert attention from the real reasons i.e. the Saudi decision and the objective convergence of the Iranian-Saudi interests.

4-     It is worth reminding that the first extension in 2013 as voted while President Suleiman was still in office. Why is it not possible today to hold elections? Why didn’t we have elections last year?

5-     It is very important for both the Free patriotic Movement and the Kataeb to draw the relevant conclusions from what happened last week. Political alliances cannot be one way. They have to reflect a genuine political project or else they become pure treachery.

6-     The biggest lie though is that the elections were postponed for security reasons. We all know that the conflict in Syria is a protracted one and will last for years ahead and that the fight against terrorism is a never-ending one. Does this mean we should keep the same Parliament for 10 years? Is the Civil Society today a legitimate partner while it was demonized a while ago?

7-     The fact that the Civil Society protests did not mobilize a lot of people comes as no surprise. In fact, when the majority of the Lebanese do not endorse human rights values, they cannot be relied on in fights such as this one.

8-     What is surprising though is that some political figures “suddenly remembered” the Civil Society while they did not refrain before from systematically undermining the work of these organizations. The memory of Minister Jreissaty seems to be too flawed. Can the same Civil society be “suspicious” in some cases and called upon in other cases?

9-     Referring to the International Human rights instruments by some politicians is another absurd approach since these same figures intended to delegitimize the human rights legal framework for years while today they refer to it to support their discourse?

10-  The end result is that the decision to extend the Parliament’s mandate is consistent with the scale of values of most of the Lebanese who never endorsed the values of Human dignity, freedom and equality. This is understandably reflected in the practices of a morally corrupt political establishment. So stop whining and revisit the scale of values before blaming others.

Islamic State and Related Attacks in Lebanon Demand Comprehensive Response

By: Elie Abouaoun
Islamic State and Related Attacks in Lebanon Demand Comprehensive
Response

Tuesday, November 4, 2014

Attacks by militants in Lebanon backed by an Al-Qaida affiliate and the
Islamic State have highlighted again the vulnerability of the country's
armed forces to terrorist threats and the political establishment's failure to
reach agreement on a military strategy to confront terrorism. The solution
will require much more than addressing the shortcomings of the military.
Political leaders must address the underlying factors that contribute to the
ability of extremists to make inroads and recruit on Lebanese soil.

Outbreaks of fighting in Lebanon have heightened fears that the war in Syria is spilling over the border, threatening their fragile stability.

The August assault on several military and police posts in the Lebanese border town of Arsal raised fears of a replica of the Islamic State’s capture of Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul.

While the militant groups, led by al-Qaida affiliate Nusra Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, ultimately backed off in Lebanon – that time -- it was clearly a tactical withdrawal. Insurgents linked to or inspired by the extremist groups have staged multiple assaults since then.

Neither Nusra Front nor the Islamic State can spare fighters to mount a full invasion of Lebanon, as some overly dramatic political observers have claimed. But the acute Sunni-Shia polarization in the broader region, the chaotic management of the Syrian refugees influx, and the continual flow of money to militant groups, compounded by financial and logistical help from Lebanese factions and the country’s own deep divisions, have contributed to the
radicalization of youths and opportunities for recruitment of fighters.

The new international coalition to counter the Islamic State may be able to degrade the group’s capabilities eventually, but the offensive is unlikely to destroy the militant organization entirely, so the threat will remain. and Lebanon must shore up its own defenses.

The discord within Lebanon’s government, which emerges regularly on other dangerous issues as well, essentially has paralyzed political decision-making and deprived the Lebanese Army of the necessary political umbrella to launch a larger military operation against the militant attacks. The tensions are exacerbated by divisions over the role of Hezbollah in supporting the forces of President Bashar al-Assad in neighboring Syria.

The Lebanese armed forces, as a result, suffer from a lack of proper training, equipment and command-and-control functions and from impunity for inept or corrupt high-ranking officers.

Now that Lebanon is in an open confrontation with terrorist groups, all efforts are converging to buy equipment and train army personnel.

A comprehensive strategy

But just as important is a comprehensive strategy to address emerging terrorist threats that includes a military aspect – strengthening the armed forces, eliminating politicization of the military and instituting accountability measures – but also contains political and social dimensions. The Lebanese government must find a way to cope reasonably with the ticking time bomb of the Syrian refugee crisis. At the same time, officials must shore up the domestic
education system, boost the economy and resume a long-stalled national dialogue to reach a political settlement among the country’s feuding factions.

The clash in refugee policies and practices by the United Nations and the Lebanese government has heightened the susceptibility of Syrian refugees to recruitment by militant groups, putting the Lebanese armed forces in the unsavory position of either conducting military operations in refugee camps and settlements that could result in civilian casualties, or just standing by while terrorist groups fill their ranks.

The registration of Syrian refugees has been flawed since its very beginning, so the available numbers today are actually higher than the reality, in part because a number of Syrians live in Lebanon because of economic hardship at home, not necessarily because they risk violence or harm . Authorities should urgently undertake a review of the status of refugees in Lebanon based on transparent criteria and in compliance with international standards, and then provide those legitimately fleeing violence with the international protection to which
they are entitled and adopt a long-delayed foreign-labor policy to handle the remainder.

The government also could design innovative solutions to provide education for the estimated 250,000 young Syrian refugees who aren’t getting an education and devise employment programs for the adults. Ad-hoc settlements of refugees also need to be better organized to improve the efficiency and delivery of the services they need.

For its own citizens, Lebanon’s government must reform the education system, address the significant socio-economic gaps and, most importantly, re-launch a genuine national dialogue process to move the country beyond its debilitating divisions. Lebanon’s economic growth has plunged since the outbreak of conflict next door in Syria, from 8 percent in 2010 to less than 1 percent in 2013, according to the World Bank. And while private education has
ballooned, the government has fallen behind not only in the schools and universities it runs but also in adequately regulating and holding accountable the private sector. Today’s reality of the education sector in Lebanon, coupled with the difficulty finding employment, especially for youth, creates the ideal conditions for radical groups to ramp up their own enrollment
efforts.
Failing to adopt a comprehensive strategy to counter extremist violence and influence only adds to the multiple vulnerabilities of Lebanon, turning a small country into an attractive theater of operations for an array of nefarious players.

Elie Abouaoun is director of Middle East programs at USIP and a lecturer at Saint Joseph University in Beirut.