Q&A: Will U.S. Strikes on Syria Change Conflict’s Course?

On the Issues with USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Nancy Lindborg

Friday, April 7, 2017 / BY: USIP Staff

The United States launched its first air strikes against forces backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since the country’s civil war began six years ago, in retaliation for a chemical-weapons attack that killed more than 80 civilian men, women and children. Elie Abouaoun, who is director of Middle East and North Africa programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace and is based in the region, examines the strategic implications, and USIP President Nancy Lindborg, who has worked for nearly 30 years on humanitarian crises and areas affected by conflict, comments on the factors that prompted the U.S. attack.

The American strikes with 59 Tomahawk missiles targeted Syrian aircraft, air defense systems, equipment and infrastructure at Shayrat Airfield in western Syria, the base in Homs Province where the planes responsible for this week’s chemical attack in Idlib are believed to have originated. The Russian military, which has backed Assad’s forces in the war, received advance warning of the U.S. air strikes, the Washington Post reported, citing American officials. Russia ostensibly joined the war to assist in the battle against the ISIS extremist group, which is among myriad discordant forces fighting to oust Assad and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate across northern Syria and Iraq. But Russia’s operations frequently have hit opponents of Assad considered to be more moderate.

Were these U.S. strikes necessary?

Lindborg: These targeted air strikes were an appropriate response to the unacceptable war crime of using sarin gas on your own people, which is just the latest of a long list of war crimes the Assad regime has perpetrated against the people of Syria. We have limited international tools to stop this level of violence used by a state against its own people. Nothing to date has been effective, especially with the obstructionist role of Russia in the Security Council, where it has repeatedly denied years of barrel bombing, starvation or targeting of health clinics and medical personnel by the Assad regime or even the suffering and humanitarian need that the attacks have generated.

What is the likely effect of the U.S. strikes on Assad and the opposition forces fighting to oust him?

Lindborg: One strike will not solve the wickedly complex conflict of Syria, with multiple terror groups, regional actors with a web of conflicting interests and an utterly destroyed country with nearly half its people displaced.  The biggest question is what's next and next and then what.

Abouaoun: If the U.S. military attack is limited to these 59 air strikes, it is not likely to change the course of the conflict, at least not in the short term. It could improve the morale of the anti-Assad forces, but they are not likely to become any more united than they have been, unless the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia put enough pressure on Assad to change his behavior or force him to negotiate more seriously. 

What would it take for Turkey and the United States to mend their strained relationship to cooperate more on Syria?

Abouaoun: The U.S. would have to persuade Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to halt his sprint towards the Russians and restore Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. That means assuring Erdogan that Turkey will be able to influence Syria’s political transition and benefit economically from its reconstruction. He also would want a role in security arrangements in northern Syria. That includes guarantees that Syria’s Kurds, whom he sees as aligned with the Kurdish PKK militant group in Turkey and who have been among the best fighting forces in Syria against Assad, won’t be allowed to establish a mini-state on his border.  

How are the Russians likely to respond to the U.S. strikes in Syria?

Abouaoun: The Russians need to understand that the space they had to maneuver under President Obama has shrunk and that it is, therefore, time to bargain. But they also want certain guarantees, such as that Assad and his family will not to be killed like Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi or imprisoned, as in the case of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak. The Russians want continued control of their Mediterranean naval base in Syria and, like Turkey, to ensure they can influence Syria’s political transition and benefit from the country’s reconstruction.

What reaction might we see from Iran to the U.S. strikes?

Abouaoun: The Iranians are known for their strategic patience. They are fairly unlikely to strike back against the U.S. directly outside of Syria. Iran has a clear agenda in Syria that goes beyond preserving the person or the regime of Assad. It is about access to parts of Syria.

How committed are the Iranians to backing Assad?

Abouaoun: Iran remains the major obstacle Assad’s removal, contributing thousands of military advisors and support for pro-Assad militias such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias. Iran’s primary objective is to make sure any new regime in Syria either accommodates the Iranian agenda or will be too weak to thwart it.

Insights on Libya (filmed in DC - December 2016)

The US should not just watch North Africa slip into chaos

The US should not just watch North Africa slip into chaos

The Ameri­cans’ withdrawal will almost certainly foster a level of disorder likely to pull the United States back in later and at a greater cost.

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 2017/03/26  Issue: 99  Page: 11

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 The Arab Weekly
 Elie Abouaoun

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Curbing US involvement abroad was a signal campaign promise of the new US adminis­tration. Anything that smacked of nation-building drew the sharpest criticism. The appeal to many voters of such disengagement is understandable and the view is woven into an evolving foreign policy.

The problem is that the Ameri­cans’ withdrawal will almost certainly foster a level of disorder likely to pull the United States back in later and at a greater cost, damag­ing American interests that can only be advanced by peace and stability.

Nowhere is that more clearly the case than in North Africa. From Egypt to Morocco, the region’s countries are struggling with terror­ism, radicalisation, socioeconomic stagnation, ineffective governance and corruption.

Obviously, building the resil­ience of those societies must be an indigenous effort first and foremost but the role of the United States is indispensable in supporting local, regional and international efforts to break existing and prospective cycles of violence. Even where local actors are most effective in driving changes that deter extremism, they generally lack the capacity to do so without international support, the cornerstone of which comes from the United States.

Libya’s collapse illustrates how an internal violent conflict can affect regional and international security.

As multiple militias and factions vie for power in the absence of a working central government, a safe haven opened for terrorists fleeing Iraq and Syria, who join extrem­ist groups in Libya. Although the Islamic State (ISIS) was largely sup­pressed by recent military action, this diverse array of militants is establishing a pattern of operations that seems designed to expand their activities beyond Libya’s borders, posing a threat to US interests and counterterrorism efforts in Africa.

The lack of a focused US invest­ment in Libyan politics, which predates the new administration, encourages Russia to bolster its existing diplomatic and military presence — and later, no doubt, an economic one. Just as Syria has provided a gateway for Russia’s re­turn to the Middle East, Libya may open the way to North Africa. Last, but not least, the military conflict in Libya will add to uncertainty in energy markets for the foreseeable future.

More uncertainty could arise from developments in Egypt, the primary supplier of natural gas to American ally Jordan, and Algeria, the world’s 18th largest oil producer. Both are on the verge of a metastatic instabil­ity. A laissez-faire policy towards the two countries will help precipi­tate their descent into communal violence. Expanding radicalisation, economic hardship and the divisive policies of authoritarian leaders are causing irreversible damage, fuel­ling grudges and deepening vertical social fractures.

This offers a golden opportunity to ISIS and other extremists. The conditions are in some ways similar to Iraq in 2014 when grievances of many ordinary Iraqis bred the perception of ISIS as a valid alterna­tive to a repressive government. Most Iraqis, of course, regretted tolerating ISIS but it was too late. The world is acknowledging the high price of ignoring early warn­ings persistently conveyed by many experts, agencies and civil society organisations in 2012-14.

Tunisia has taken a more positive and constructive path than its North African peers. Certainly, the country faces colossal political, economic and social challenges that feed the scourge of home-grown and transnational terrorism. However, Tunisia’s unique example in the Middle East and North Africa of an indigenous national dialogue dif­fusing a political crisis, as occurred in 2013, presents a model for how locally owned conflict-management mechanisms contribute to peace and security.

Likewise, Tunisia’s combined secular-Islamist government and parliament demonstrates the suc­cess of inclusive political settle­ments, a relevant lesson to coun­tries in North Africa and beyond on how to manage political, religious or ethnic diversity. Consistent and generous support for Tunisia’s ailing economy is crucial to the country in maintaining its political direction and its efforts to counter violent extremism.

In a country where 1.4 million of the 3 million citizens under 25 years of age are out of school and work, it is little wonder that thousands of young people have joined extrem­ist groups. Radicalisation is a social disease with multiple roots. It will take US leadership of an interna­tional effort to support Tunisian strategies to cure it.

The challenge posed by North Africa’s instability and extremism leaves the United States with only one sound policy option to protect its interests: Increased, determined and steady political and economic support. The alternative is watching the region slip into chaos that may be impossible to reverse no matter what resources the Americans bring to bear.

Article about Censoriship in Lebanon - (في الرقابة (لبنان

ي الرقابة…

د. ايلي أبو عون ¹

أمين عام جمعية ألف–تحرك من أجل حقوق الأنسان

أستاذ محاضر (زائر) في مادة حقوق الأنسان

استعرت مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي مرة جديدة ابان اطلاق اغنية ميريام كلينك و استفاق الجدل عن الرقابة و دور الدولة في حماية القيم الاجتماعية. رغم أن الانقسام حول أغنية كلينك لم يكن بنفس الحدية التي رأيناها في حالات أخرى (لعله نتيجة وقاحة الأغنية و قلة ذوقها و اقحام طفلة فيها) لكن “خطوط التباين” بين مؤيد و معارض ظلت الى حد كبير هي نفسها. و قبل الخوض في جوهر النقاش لا بد من عرض أنواع الرقابة و أهدافها بشكل عام.

مفهوم الرقابة تطور كثيرا مع مرور الزمن و لو ان النيجة لم تختلف كثيرا. عادة يعلل وجود آليات رقابة على الأعمال الفنية و الأكاديمية و الاعلامية و الأعلانية و غيرها على انها وسيلة لحماية المجتمع بينما تتحول في السواد الأعظم من الحالات الى اداة لكم الأفواه.

فالرقابة عادةً ما تكون إمّا ذاتية (من صاحب الرأي أو العمل نفسه) و اما خارجية (من طرف ثالث) و اما أن تكون ضمن سياق قانوني\اداري (محكمة, وزارة, مجلس وطني للاعلام…) أو سياق خاص (عائلي, اجتماعي, ديني, اكاديمي: مهني…). كما تقسم الرقابة الى مسبقة (قبل صدور المنتج) او لاحقة (بعد صدوره).

مبدأ الوصاية على المجتمع من قبل مراجع منصبة قانونياً أو عرفياً قديم, من قدم البشرية, و هو متلاصق بطبيعة البشر و لا جدوى من توقع التخلص منه بالكامل. في الوقت نفسه, لا بد من أن يترافق مع ضوابط واضحة كي لا يتحول الى أداة قمع. و بما أن الهدف (المعلن أقلّه) من أي آلية رقابية هو حماية المجتمع و القيم, وجب تقييد مخرجات هكذا ألية باطار مبادئ حقوق الأنسان النابعة من “الكرامة المتأصلة في جميع أعضاء الأسرة البشرية” كما جاء في الأعلان العالمي لحقوق الأنسان.

و انسجاماً مع هذه الضرورة الأخلاقية, برزت نماذج في عدة دول معروفة بممارسة ديمقراطية متقدمة مفيدة للحالة اللبنانية التي لا تزال تتخبط بآلية رقابية قديمة و قمعية و غير مجدية, خاصة في عصر العولمة و الأعلام المتاح للكبير و الصغير دون اذن و دستور .

احدى ضوابط الرقابة أوّلاً أن تكون لاحقة و غير مسبقة لأنّ الأخيرة تتحول حكماً الى فعل قمعي و مقيّد للحريات. فالرقابة المسبقة تأخذ غالبا شكل “الحكم على النوايا” و\أو ترتكز على رأي شخصي استنسابي في السواد الأعظم من الحالات.

و هنا تأتي أهمية هوية المرجع المولج مسؤولية الفعل الرقابي. ففي لبنان كما في كل الدول السلطوية اعطيت الصلاحية الرقابية الى هيئات أمنية أو دينية (حسب الحالة). و في كلتا الحالتين تتداخل الأراء الشخصية مع المواقف المتحجرة لتحول هدف الحماية الى منحى قاتل للحريات الفردية و الأبداع. كما و يزيد بين الشرخ بين شرائح من المجتمع و هذه الهيئات الأمنية أو الدينية. فالأمنيين مدربون للقيام بمهام أمنية و المراجع الدينية تجيد العمل الدعووي و الرعوي و في كلتا الحالتين هم غير مخولين الحكم على ما هو مناسب للمجتمع من مقالات أو كتب أو أفلام أو اعمال مسرحية أو اعلانات…ألخ. فهل يعقل أن يتحكم مرجع أمني أو ديني بما أنا اراه مناسبا لأطفالي أو لعائلتي؟ أن هذه الممارسة تفترض في ألأساس أن المجتمع قاصر و غير قادر على التمييز بين الخير و الشر بما ينسف ليس فقط حرية الضمير و المعتقد بل جوهر الأديان التي تقوم بغالبيتها على مبدأ أن المؤمن هو من يقرر مدى و طريقة ممارسته للشعائر الدينية لأنه من خلق الرب و يتمتع بعقل و ضمير يسمحان له بالتمييز بين ما يرضي “الخالق” و ما لا يرضيه.

المرجع الوحيد المؤهّل القيام بالرقابة اللاحقة هو القضاء, بناءً على نصوص قانونية و اجتهادات قضائية, لما لهذا المرجع من مؤهلات و ضوابط قانونية و دستورية تمنعه من الأنزلاق الى الاستنسابية أو التسلط.

أخيراً و ليس أخرا وجب التمييز بين الموقف المتشدد من الرقابة السلطوية و بين الموافقة على الانحرافات الأجتماعية الذي يجب أن تسعى الدولة الى مواجتها في اطار دورها في الحماية. فمن يعترض على ألية الرقابة الاستنسابية ليس بالضرورة منسجما مع سلوك البعض الصادم (كاغنية كلينك مثلا أو أفعال صادمة أخرى). فيمكن لأي شخص أن يكون له موقف (سلبي, حيادي أو أيجابي) من هكذا أعمال و أن يكون في نفس الوقت ضنينا بالحفاظ على الحريات و حقوق الانسان و ضرورة حكم القانون بديلا عن حكم الأهواء الشخصية لهيئات أمنية أو دينية.

أن حماية المجتمع من الانحرافات الأجتماعية لا يبرر قيام وصي على ضميرنا أو الحكم على قدرتنا التمييز بين الخير و الشر. و لن يكون يوما كاهنا أو شيخا أو عنصرا أمنيا أوعى من أب أو أم أو أخت أو أخ فيما يتعلق بمصلحة أفراد عائلته التي لا يمكن أن تحددها الا أطر قضائية تعتمد القانون مرجعا أولا و أخيرا

1  ان الأراء الواردة في هذا المقال لا تعبر بالضرورة عن سياسية أو أراء المؤسسات التي يرتبط معها الكاتب بعلاقة مهنية

Despite Threats, Hezbollah Unlikely to Hit Israel Now


by Elie Abouaoun
www.usip.org
14 March 2017

The Lebanese militia Hezbollah's intensifying threats against Israel, such as warnings that the group could cause massive casualties by striking Haifa’s ammonia facilities, probably are less dangerous than they appear. While an outbreak of fighting between the two antagonists is always possible, for now Hezbollah has little motive to disturb the unspoken rules that govern their enduring conflict.

Hezbollah’s bombast more likely reflects its concern that Israel might decide the time is right to change those rules and attack the Shiite organization on its home base in Lebanon.

The Israel-Hezbollah understanding essentially avoids retaliation by Hezbollah from Lebanon for Israeli actions in Syria. So long as Israel avoids striking in Lebanon, the Israeli-Lebanese border, bristling with tens of thousands of Hezbollah rockets and missiles, remains quiet. The arrangement has persisted even as Hezbollah has sent thousands of militants to fight for Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad.

The long game for Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor is playing out along Syria’s border with Israel. After relieving Syrian government troops in some parts of Syria and defeating rebels fighting Assad’s forces in others, Hezbollah is building up its presence in the Syrian-Israeli border areas of the Golan Heights.

While Hezbollah may have to absorb attacks against its leaders or bases in Syria, such losses are seen as the cost of establishing another layer of strategic threat to Israeli security. It took Hezbollah from 1982 to 1996 to build a powerful presence in southern Lebanon despite repeated Israeli operations.

Hezbollah’s role in Syria also inhibits serious provocations against Israel. A war with Israel would force Hezbollah to fight in Lebanon, stretching thin its capacities and eroding performance on the very strategic Syrian battlefield.

Concerns Build

Hezbollah likely sees several reasons for concern about Israel’s intentions:

• Distrust between the Gulf Cooperation Council and Iran is at an all-time pitch. Attempts at rapprochement between Israel and some GCC nations are seen as a possible prelude to discreetly coordinating a wider military action.
• Israel may sense a grace period to act without U.S. restraints before the new administration in Washington settles on a Middle East policy.
• In Lebanon, relations between Sunnis, who generally view the Shiite militia as a threat, and Shiites, who largely back Hezbollah, are more strained than ever, posing a threat to Hezbollah in its back yard.
• Hezbollah’s buildup on the Syrian border, seen by Israel as expanding the Iranian threat along another frontier, could provide justification for a wider war. That message was apparently conveyed to Hezbollah’s chief Hassan Nasrallah in the past weeks, according to Arabic-language news reports, triggering his warnings that Hezbollah can hit Haifa’s ammonia facilities. Israeli researchers say such an attack could kill hundreds of thousands of people.

Hezbollah usually reminds the world of its deterrent capabilities when its legitimacy is challenged or when it senses Israel might change the rules of engagement. The group is almost certainly not looking for a fight right now.

Its short-term priorities are to maintain the status quo with Israel, keep Assad in power and maintain relative stability in Lebanon, where Hezbollah controls key positions, including the presidency, the speaker of parliament, the heads of the army and most security agencies. As a result, the prospects for war in the near future may depend in part on whether Israel really envisages a war with Hezbollah or is just pushing back to prevent its adversary from miscalculating its way into a new foray.

My article on Freedom of expression in Lebanon / Published by Mensuel Magazine